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I.

INTRODUCTION

First, ―do no harm.‖ This familiar Hippocratic oath presents a very real
challenge to the lawyer who counsels a vengeful client. Consider, for
example, this not uncommon occurrence in the law office of a typical family
law lawyer.2 A client seeking a divorce relays to the lawyer a laundry list of
wrongs committed by his spouse—from being selfish and greedy, to being a
spendthrift and habitual liar. The lawyer learns that the client has two young
children and that the client has been the primary breadwinner, while his
spouse has been a stay-at-home mother following the birth of the couple‘s
first child. The lawyer experiences some pangs of empathy for the obviously
distraught client as she learns that the client‘s spouse has been having an
adulterous affair for the past two years. During the meeting, the lawyer
agrees to represent the client and a week later files divorce papers on behalf of
the client.
During their next meeting, the lawyer and client begin to discuss the
couple‘s assets, the client‘s objectives, and custodial issues. During this
discussion, the client states:
1

I want you to ask for custody of the children. I know we
can get a better financial deal if we threaten custody because
1. Hippocrates, Of the Epidemics, in 10 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 44, 46
(Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952). Although these exact words do not appear in the Hippocratic
oath, the oath is commonly understood to include that language.
2. Although this Article explores a family law scenario, vengeful clients are by no means
limited to family law litigation. Any communication between two or more individuals or business
entities has the potential for misunderstandings, attributions of ―bad‖ motives, and blame. With
ineffective communication skills, any such misunderstandings and attributions can result in anger,
resentment, and a desire for revenge. Thus, anger and the desire for vengeance can arise in business
relationships as well as in personal relationships and can be a driving force behind legal strategies in
transactional as well as litigation matters.
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the kids are Rebecca‘s life and she‘ll do anything to avoid
losing them. Besides, I don‘t want that SOB she‘s sleeping
with to raise my children.3
Surprised by this request, the lawyer asks the client to clarify his position:
―Bob, are you telling me that you would like primary physical custody of the
children?‖ The client responds: ―No way. I‘ve got a busy career, and I‘m not
up to handling the children on a full-time basis.‖4
The lawyer then attempts to dissuade the client from this negotiating ploy,
informing the client that she is prohibited by ethical rules from making
demands that do not have a factual basis.5 The client responds:
Well, don‘t worry about it. I could always assume
primary custody of the children if necessary; after all, I love
my children. In fact, I could hire a full-time nanny for

3. See Robert Dinerstein et al., Connection, Capacity and Morality in Lawyer-Client
Relationships: Dialogues and Commentary, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 755, 788–93, 798–804 (2004)
(exemplifying a similar dialogue between lawyer and client and an evaluation of the lawyer‘s efforts
to dissuade the client from such tactics).
4. This tactic appears to be common. See Scott Altman, Lurking in the Shadow, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 493, 495–96 (1995) (concluding from surveys and interviews with judges and lawyers that this
tactic is fairly commonplace); Andrea K. Schneider & Nancy Mills, What Family Lawyers Are
Really Doing When They Negotiate, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 612, 616–18 (2006) (concluding from an
empirical study that family law lawyers were reported as being more adversarial and unethical than
in any other specialty area); Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody,
80 CAL. L. REV. 615, 646 (1992) (contending that this strategy is ―common in divorce contests‖).
But see Robert H. Mnookin et al., Private Ordering Revisited: What Custodial Arrangements Are
Parents Negotiating?, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 37, 50 (Stephen D. Sugarman &
Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990) (contending that this type of threat does not occur very frequently or
meet with great success).
5. Most lawyers consider this bargaining strategy to be immoral and unethical. See Altman,
supra note 4, at 500. According to Altman‘s survey of family law lawyers:
Three out of four lawyers asserted that threatening custody litigation is never
ethical. Among those who thought it sometimes ethical, some indicated in
written comments that they believed the practice is permitted by the codes of
professional responsibility, though not necessarily by morality. A few indicated
that litigation threats or other pressures to trade were inevitable, a natural part of
bargaining, demanded by zealous advocacy, or acceptable in limited
circumstances, such as in response to inappropriate actions from the other side.
Id.
Rule 2.25 of the suggested standards of conduct promulgated by the American Academy of
Matrimonial Lawyers specifically states that ―[a]n attorney should not contest child custody or
visitation for either financial leverage or vindictiveness.‖ STANDARDS OF CONDUCT R. 2.25 (Am.
Acad. of Matrimonial Lawyers 1991). The comments state that not only is it improper for a lawyer to
assist a client in such conduct, but also that the lawyer should withdraw from representation if the
client persists. Id. at 2.25 cmt.
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them—yeah, I could make it work. And besides, the children
would be better off with me than with that SOB trying to be
their father.
The lawyer continues to remonstrate with the client, asking the client to
consider the morality of such a ploy and the effect of his actions on his
children. When the client remains adamant, the lawyer remarks that some
clients find it helpful to seek the help of a mental health professional while
going through a divorce. The client not only refuses to do so but angrily
proclaims: ―You‘re supposed to be my lawyer; you‘re supposed to be on my
side. If you can‘t represent me, then I‘ll just have to think about finding
someone who can.‖6
With that, the lawyer is faced with a quandary—whether to resign as the
client‘s lawyer7 or agree to do the client‘s bidding. Unfortunately, the
economic reality of losing this fee-paying client makes it difficult for the
lawyer to decline to represent her client. 8 Therefore, she quells the small
voice inside that whispers ―this isn‘t right‖ and reluctantly agrees to serve as
the client‘s ―hired gun.‖9 The lawyer justifies the ploy by reminding herself
that the demand is within the bounds of ethics—the client has, after all, stated
that he is willing to assume custody if necessary.10 The lawyer also reminds
herself that she is on the side of ―right‖—the client really does seem to have

6. The lawyer‘s lack of success in dissuading the client from such a course of action is
relatively common. See Altman, supra note 4, at 499–500.
7. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct allow lawyers, under certain conditions, to
withdraw from representing a client if the client ―insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers
repugnant.‖ MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4) (2002). The withdrawal must have
no ―material adverse effect on the interests of the client,‖ id. at 1.16(b)(1), and, in matters before a
tribunal, the attorney must comply with applicable law that might require the attorney to obtain the
permission of the tribunal, id. at 1.16(c).
8. The economic fear likely extends beyond the loss of this particular client to clients in
general, with the lawyer fearing that many clients similarly wish to hire a gladiator. See Robert F.
Cochran, Jr., Deborah L. Rhode, Paul R. Tremblay & Thomas L. Shaffer, Symposium: Client
Counseling and Moral Responsibility, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 591, 607 (2003) [hereinafter Symposium].
Rhode notes that ―lawyers‘ reluctance to challenge clients‘ self-interest makes perfect sense. These
individuals are, after all, generally footing the bill for the lawyers‘ services.‖ Id.; see also DAVID
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 58 (1988) (noting that ―three hundred dollars
an hour has been known to buy a lot of partisanship, and will even stand in quite nicely for
nonaccountability, especially around the first of the month‖).
9. See Joseph Allegretti, Have Briefcase Will Travel: An Essay on the Lawyer as Hired Gun,
24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 747, 749 (1990) (discussing the metaphor of the lawyer as hired gun).
10. Because the client insists that he would assume custody if necessary, the lawyer justifies the
bargaining strategy by reasoning that there is the requisite factual basis for the lawyer to press
forward with such a bargaining ploy, however weak the basis may be. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘ L
CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2002) (prohibiting the assertion of frivolous claims); see also DAVID A. BINDER ET
AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS : A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 295 (2d ed. 2004).
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been exploited by his dishonest and immoral spouse. 11 After seemingly
endless months of legal wrangling and an escalation of hostility, the lawyer
eventually attains a favorable financial package for the client in exchange for
dropping the demand for primary physical custody.
Has the lawyer served her client well? The client walks away from this
experience with a favorable financial package. At the same time, however,
the client is experiencing greater anger and stress the day the divorce becomes
final than he was the day he walked into the lawyer‘s office to file for
divorce. 12 He is angry at his spouse‘s outrageous demands during the
litigation process; he is furious at his spouse‘s lawyer, convinced that the
lawyer is a ruthless shark; and he is still angry that another man will be a
primary male role model in the lives of his children. The client is also
suffering from debilitating headaches, and he experiences shortness of breath
during times of stress. The stress the client is experiencing is heightened by
his concern for his children, whose grades have suffered and who have
become alternately withdrawn and angry. 13
The lawyer, too, does not experience much satisfaction in her role as a
―hired gun‖14 in this litigation. The lawyer regrets that she was not able to
persuade the client to do ―the right thing‖ and privately longs to make a more
meaningful contribution to the lives of her clients. The lawyer reluctantly
acknowledges that she has become somewhat apathetic to a career that once
held such promise.
This experience is not limited to family law. The mutual dissatisfaction of
both the client and lawyer reflects a more widespread dissatisfaction with the
11. It is all too easy to rationalize why such tactics are fair game, particularly when the lawyer
has bought into the client‘s self-view as a victim of a laundry list of wrongs committed by the spouse.
See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 8, at 612. Rhode notes that lawyers are not exempt from selfserving psychological biases. Id. Thus, lawyers often shift their initial judgments about their clients,
ultimately identifying with their clients‘ decisions. Id.
12. This experience is quite common among clients who participate in adversarial litigation,
with the litigation process escalating the tension between the participants. See, e.g., Thomas W.
Porter, Jr., The Spirit and the Law, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1155, 1157 (1999); Elizabeth K.
Strickland, Putting “Counselor” Back in the Lawyer’s Job Description: Why More States Should
Adopt Collaborative Law Statutes, 84 N.C. L. REV. 979, 980 (2006); Janet Weinstein, And Never the
Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of Children and the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV.
79, 132–33 (1997).
13. This is quite common among children whose parents exhibit hostility and aggression during
a divorce. Such children are at increased risk of depression, substance abuse, poor academic
performance, and poor social competence. Solangel Maldonado, Cultivating Forgiveness: Reducing
Hostility and Conflict after Divorce, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 441, 454 (2008).
14. See generally Allegretti, supra note 9 (discussing the metaphor of the lawyer as a hired
gun). Allegretti posits that the metaphor of the lawyer as a hired gun is pervasive within the legal
profession. Id. at 749. He argues that law students are ―trained to see themselves as the hired guns
of clients,‖ with their personal values and beliefs playing no role in how they should perform their
job. Id.
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American legal system in general. The public commonly perceives lawyers as
unethical, slick tricksters who will resort to any tactic to win. 15 Within the
legal profession itself, an excessive focus on the economic outcomes of legal
matters, to the exclusion of psychological and emotional costs, 16 has
contributed to an environment of brutal competition and unethical behavior—
an environment where ―[e]veryone is a potential adversary‖ and ―[t]rust is a
mirage on the horizon.‖17
Within the midst of this crisis of conscience, legal scholars have argued
that lawyers should, where appropriate, dissuade their clients from unethical
or immoral acts.18 However, vengeful clients are remarkably resistant to
appeals based on morality and even economic self-interest.19 Thus, it is not
surprising that lawyers have been largely ineffective in their efforts to
dissuade angry clients from using the legal system as a battlefield.
Although psychology and neuroscience offer critical insights into why
angry clients do not behave as rational actors, 20 there is a dearth of legal
scholarship addressing how these disciplines can help lawyers recognize,
understand, and effectively counsel the vengeful client. This Article takes an
interdisciplinary approach to understanding and resolving this important yet
neglected problem.
15. See id. at 749–50. Allegretti notes that the public commonly views lawyers as ―hired guns
who put the interests of clients ahead of the common good, and who are willing to do everything in
their power to defend the guilty and frustrate justice by resorting to legal ‗technicalities.‘‖ Id. at 750;
see also Linda Meyer, Between Reason and Power: Experiencing Legal Truth, in MORALITY,
JUSTICE, AND THE LAW: THE CONTINUING DEBATE 109, 109 (M. Katherine B. Darmer & Robert M.
Baird eds., 2007) (describing lawyers as being vilified as ―sharks, snakes, liars, word-twisters, hairsplitters, [and] crowd-panderers‖).
16. Interestingly, one survey reflects that, although lawyers believe that clients are most
interested in whether they have ―won,‖ clients report that they care more about the process itself and
whether a fair and equitable settlement has been achieved. See Tom Tyler, Client Perceptions of
Litigation—What Counts: Process or Result?, TRIAL, July 1988, at 40, 40. In fact, clients report that
the number of assets they end up ―winning‖ is the least important factor. Id.; see also Strickland,
supra note 12, at 981 (finding that ―[d]espite all the animosity, most clients just want a fair result‖).
17. STEVEN KEEVA, TRANSFORMING PRACTICES: FINDING JOY AND SATISFACTION IN THE
LEGAL LIFE 10 (1999).
18. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE : REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 58 (2000); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS‘
ETHICS 138 (1998); David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS‘
ROLES AND LAWYERS‘ ETHICS 83, 118 (David Luban ed., 1984).
19. See discussion infra Part II.B.5.
20. Legal scholars have examined behavioral economics to explore the biases and perceptions
that explain why clients may not behave as rational actors. See, e.g., BINDER ET AL., supra note 10,
at 351–56; ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR. ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW: A COLLABORATIVE
APPROACH TO CLIENT INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 122–34 (2d ed. 2006); see also Russell B.
Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption
from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1055–56 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, How Law
Constructs Preferences, 86 GEO. L.J. 2637, 2637 (1998).
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Building on studies in neuroscience, psychology, and medicine, Part II of
this Article explores the hidden psychological, emotional, and physiological
costs incurred by angry clients when lawyers agree to serve as their hired
guns. This section also sheds light on why vengeful clients are so resistant to
rational appeals based on morality and economic self-interest. In Part III, this
Article argues that lawyers are not only uniquely situated to help angry
clients, but that they must in fact address the client‘s underlying emotional
pain in order to provide competent representation. Part IV of this Article
provides a prescriptive framework for lawyers to use in helping vengeful
clients significantly reduce the anger that otherwise impairs lawyers‘ ability to
engage in effective client counseling.
II. THE DILEMMA OF THE VENGEFUL CLIENT
A. Defining the Vengeful Client
This Article is not suggesting that all anger is unhealthy or that lawyers
should in every instance attempt to persuade clients to relinquish anger.
Indeed, anger can be an important catalyst for action. For example, anger can
galvanize one to move away from an abusive or dangerous situation, 21 or it
can help move a client from a state of despair and hopelessness toward a
healthier emotional state. 22 Anger can also inspire people to move into action
to right a social injustice. For example, anger was presumably a motivating
factor that spurred Martin Luther King III to lead the civil rights movement
and to argue for legal change in our society. Thus, healthy responses to anger
serve a useful purpose by galvanizing people into actions that help effect
positive change, and lawyers can serve an important role in helping clients use
the legal system to effect such change.
However, anger becomes a problem when it is not released after it has
served its limited purpose but is instead allowed to simmer and fester. 23
When anger is allowed to fester, the client can become swept up in blame and
bitterness and have difficulty releasing the resentment that is only magnifying
the pain. 24 Far from finding personal empowerment through anger, the
21. See FRED LUSKIN, FORGIVE FOR GOOD : A PROVEN PRESCRIPTION FOR HEALTH AND
HAPPINESS 13–14 (2002).
22. See ESTHER HICKS & JERRY HICKS, ASK AND IT IS GIVEN: LEARNING TO MANIFEST YOUR
DESIRES 115–19 (2004).
23. See LUSKIN, supra note 21, at 14 (contending that it is the act of holding on to anger and
carrying a grudge that causes psychological and physiological problems).
24. For example, divorcing couples often carry grudges for years and even decades.
Maldonado, supra note 13, at 447. For example, one study suggests that in ―as many as twenty-five
percent of divorced families, high levels of parental conflict continue long after the divorce is final,‖
resulting in repeated trips to the courthouse and motions to modify aspects of the divorce decree. Id.
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vengeful client is unhappy and suffering from the delusion that inflicting pain
on the other party will end his suffering. 25 The vengeful client is by no means
limited to family law disputes. Instead, the vengeful client can be an unhappy
participant in any litigation matter in which a personal relationship has soured
or in which the client believes that he has been wronged in some way.26 In
short, the vengeful client can be found in the law offices of a typical litigation
attorney, of a mediator, or even of a transactional lawyer or collaborative
lawyer.27
B. The Difficulty of Counseling the Vengeful Client Effectively
1. The Client Is Not a Rational Actor
The dilemma any conscientious lawyer faces when counseling an angry,
emotionally reactive client is that the client‘s emotionality frequently
interferes with the lawyer‘s ability to accurately assess the perceived threat
posed by the other party and the consequences of potential litigation
decisions. When gripped by anger or fear, biochemical changes in the brain
disrupt the brain‘s ability to access the higher-level reasoning capabilities of
the prefrontal cortex, which mediates the more complex reasoning functions. 28
Instead, the centrally located limbic system, which coordinates the activities
of the upper and lower regions of the brain, signals the lower regions of the
brain to activate pre-programmed survival processes.29 This activation of
at 453.
25. One tragic case in New York resulted in a physician‘s death from the injuries he incurred as
he ―blew up his six million dollar home so that his ex-wife could never have it.‖ Maldonado, supra
note 13, at 449–50 n.32; see also Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV .
555, 610 (1985). Sugarman contends that ―countless‖ plaintiffs find ―more aggravation than
satisfaction‖ when using the legal system for vengeance. Id. He concludes that, although there may
be ―occasional plaintiffs . . . who derive satisfaction from the humiliation of an adversary at trial,‖
these plaintiffs are ―only a minute proportion of the people who actually file claims.‖ Id.; see also
infra Part II.B (discussing the psychological, emotional, and physiological costs of holding onto
anger).
26. Because corporations must act through human agents, even corporate conflicts can escalate
into hostility and the desire for revenge. In today‘s economic climate, it would not be surprising to
see an increasing number of lawsuits involving angry and resentful shareholders and former
employees of floundering corporations.
27. Collaborative law is an emerging field, in domestic relations cases in particular, in which
both parties and their lawyers agree to work collaboratively to resolve the conflict without resorting
to litigation. See PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION
IN DIVORCE WITHOUT LITIGATION 3–4 (2d ed. 2008).
28. See DANIEL J. SIEGEL, THE DEVELOPING MIND: TOWARD A NEUROBIOLOGY OF
INTERPERSONAL EXPERIENCE 10 (1999) [hereinafter SIEGEL, THE DEVELOPING MIND]; DANIEL J.
SIEGEL & MARY HARTZELL, PARENTING FROM THE INSIDE OUT 155–56 (2003).
29. See LOUIS J. COZOLINO, THE NEUROSCIENCE OF PSYCHOTHERAPY: BUILDING AND
REBUILDING THE HUMAN BRAIN 23–25 (2002); PIERCE J. HOWARD, THE OWNER‘S MANUAL FOR
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survival processes engages the body via the sympathetic branch of the
autonomic nervous system, placing the body in a heightened state of readiness
for ―fight or flight.‖30
In this state, the resulting stress and anger narrow the client‘s perceptual
field.
Perceptual psychologists label this perceptual narrowing as
―downshifting.‖31 In a state of ―downshift,‖ the client has a limited ability to
be creative, to perceive and generate new meaning,32 and to perform complex
intellectual and problem-solving activities. 33 The client is also likely to be
impulsive, rigid, lacking in self-reflection, and prone to stereotyped thinking
and behavior.34 This reduced ability to think logically and clearly has been
characterized as ―view[ing] situations through a narrow-angle lens.
Intellectually you know there may be a bigger picture, but emotionally you
don‘t buy it. It‘s like you have two people living inside you—a rational
person ready to move forward, and an emotional person who feels and acts
like a hurt child.‖35
Moreover, because the desire for vengeance is motivated by the largely
unconscious drive to heal the emotional pain that underlies the anger, 36 the

THE BRAIN : EVERYDAY APPLICATIONS FROM MIND -BRAIN RESEARCH 39

(2d ed. 2000).
30. See COZOLINO, supra note 29, at 23–25; HOWARD, supra note 29, at 39; W. ROBERT NAY,
TAKING CHARGE OF ANGER: HOW TO RESOLVE CONFLICT, SUSTAIN RELATIONSHIPS, AND EXPRESS
YOURSELF WITHOUT LOSING CONTROL 34 (2004) (noting that as adrenalin and cortisol are released
into the bloodstream to trigger the ―fight-or-flight‖ response, the muscles tighten as they poise to
―fight‖ or ―flee‖ from the situation).
31. See RENATE N. CAINE & GEOFFREY CAINE, MAKING CONNECTIONS: TEACHING AND THE
HUMAN BRAIN 69–70 (1994).
32. See CAINE & CAINE, supra note 31, at 140.
33. Id. at 76 (citing studies that revealed these behavioral and cognitive characteristics of
anxious people); see also SIEGEL, THE DEVELOPING MIND, supra note 28, at 259. Siegel suggests
that in states of excessive arousal:
the ‗higher‘ processing of the neocortical circuits is shut down, and that the
direction of the energy flow within the brain and especially within the
orbitofrontal regions is determined more by input from the ‗1ower‘ processing
centers of the brainstem, sensory circuits, and limbic structures than by input
from the cortex.
Id. Siegel notes that in this state, ―we don‘t think; we feel something intensely and act impulsively.‖
Id.
34. See CAINE & CAINE, supra note 31, at 76; SIEGEL & HARTZELL, supra note 28, at 155–56;
see also Bruce Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Role of Counsel in Litigation, 37 CAL. W.
L. REV. 105, 110 (2000) (contending that when the limbic system is under stress in this way, ―[h]igh
cortisol levels produce mental errors, distraction, and impairment in the ability to remember and to
process information‖).
35. DOC CHILDRE & DEBORAH ROZMAN, TRANSFORMING ANGER: THE HEARTMATH
SOLUTION FOR LETTING GO OF RAGE, FRUSTRATION, AND IRRITATION 13 (2003).
36. Anger is only a secondary emotion that masks deeper emotional pain, such as betrayal,
guilt, shame, or fear. See MATTHEW MCKAY & PETER ROGERS, THE ANGER CONTROL WORKBOOK
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client is likely to discount and minimize the lawyer‘s warnings of the
economic and strategic risks he incurs by escalating the conflict. 37 And, from
a vantage point of fear and anger, the vengeful client may also overestimate
the danger posed by the other party and the need to ―strike first.‖ There may
well be an element of truth to the client‘s fears; however, so long as the client
is operating from a reactive, emotional state, neither the client nor the lawyer
can accurately assess just how realistic the client‘s concerns may be.
In short, the vengeful client is a client whose thinking is impaired by
emotional pain and whose anger, rather than clear-headed thinking, is driving
his decisions. From this vantage point, the lawyer cannot be entirely sure of
the likely economic consequences of the client‘s proposed actions or of the
risks involved in exploring various alternatives; thus, she may not be
optimally effective in her efforts to counsel the client.
2. Simply Following the Vengeful Client‘s Directives Imposes Hidden
Psychological and Physiological Costs
Should the lawyer elect to resolve the dilemma by simply following the
directives of the vengeful client, however ill-conceived they might appear to
be, the harmful consequences of such a decision may well extend beyond
third parties,38 the lawyer,39 and society as a collective whole40 to the client
16 (2000). However, without thoughtful prodding by the lawyer, the typical client will not openly
admit that anger is driving his litigation decisions and may not even be wholly aware of his
motivations.
37. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 4, at 646–47. Scott contends that in divorce litigation in
particular, the parties are often
not constrained by rational self-interest. The spiteful party knows that his
conduct is costly to himself as well as to his opponent but is willing to pay a
price for the gratification of inflicting injury and defeating his opponent‘s
prospects for a satisfactory outcome. Spite thus exacerbates bargaining costs,
greatly enhancing the likelihood of a negative-sum interaction.
Id. at 647 (footnote omitted).
38. See Scott, supra note 4, at 646 (concluding that the ―fallout‖ from adversarial divorce
litigation is ―likely to impose psychological costs on [their] children‖); see also Maldonado, supra
note 13, at 452–59; Nancy B. Rapoport, Seeing the Forest and the Trees: The Proper Role of the
Bankruptcy Attorney, 70 IND. L.J. 783, 783–84 (1995); Steven H. Resnicoff, The Attorney-Client
Relationship: A Jewish Law Perspective, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. P OL‘Y 349, 350–52
(2000).
39. Given the unethical behavior and brutal competitiveness of adversarial litigation, it should
come as no surprise that lawyers, as a group, suffer from a high incidence of depression and
psychological distress. See, e.g., KEEVA, supra note 17, at 5 (reporting that, while alcoholism and
substance abuse in the general population is about 10%, it is estimated that about 15% to 18% of the
nation‘s lawyers abuse alcohol or drugs); RHODE, supra note 18, at 25 (noting that lawyers ―are four
times more likely to be depressed than the public at large, and they have the highest depression rate
of any occupational group‖); Susan Daicoff, Law as a Healing Profession: The “Comprehensive Law
Movement,” 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 55 (2006) (noting that ―[l]awyers experience alcoholism,
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himself. 41 Although the client might experience temporary satisfaction with
the thought of ―war,‖ the other party typically retaliates against the client‘s act
of aggression with another act of aggression, with the cycle of war
intensifying.42 Thus, as tempting as it may be to exact vengeance through the
depression, and other forms of psychological distress and dissatisfaction at a rate of about twenty
percent—about twice the amount found in the general population‖ (citing SUSAN SWAIN DAICOFF,
LAWYER, KNOW THYSELF: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF PERSONALITY STRENTHS AND
WEAKNESSES 8 (2004)).
These results may stem, in part, from the ―deep deposits of fear and guilt, paranoia and
defensiveness‖ that are created from unethical acts. ROGER WALSH, ESSENTIAL SPIRITUALITY: THE
7 CENTRAL PRACTICES TO AWAKEN HEART AND MIND 121 (1999). ―Though perhaps hidden from
awareness by our defenses, they nevertheless agitate and cloud our minds, making it difficult to
achieve calm and clarity.‖ Id.; see also RHODE, supra note 18, at 64 (arguing that the ―avoidance of
ethical responsibility is ultimately corrosive for lawyers, clients, and the legal framework on which
they depend‖).
40. See Allegretti, supra note 9, at 771–72. Allegretti notes:
There is little doubt that hired gun thinking contributes to the delay, the costs,
the gameplaying, the large number of frivolous lawsuits, and the procedural
abuses that plague the American legal system. When lawyers see themselves as
hired guns, they are willing to do whatever it takes to win a case. . . . Hired gun
thinking leads (perhaps inevitably) to no-holds-barred advocacy, where the
courtroom becomes the OK Corral. . . . There is a natural tendency for
litigation tactics to sink to the lowest common denominator permitted by the
codes of professional responsibility.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Sadly, many lawyers ―live down‖ to their clients‘ expectations of them as hired guns,
contributing to the public distrust of lawyers. See id. at 772; see also Rapoport, supra note 38, at
783–84; Resnicoff, supra note 38, at 350–51; David Sweet, Sacrifice, Atonement, and Legal Ethics,
113 YALE L.J. 219, 243 (2003).
41. See Weinstein, supra note 12, at 132–33. Weinstein argues that, in traditional divorce
litigation, the legal system itself causes additional trauma to the divorcing parties, as well as a further
deterioration in the parties‘ relationship. Id.; see also Porter, supra note 12, at 1157. Porter
observes:
Lawyers essentially have become hired guns. Instead of resolving conflicts, the
process increases animosity and estrangement. Everyone is wounded.
Ironically, although the goal becomes winning at all costs, most clients
come away from litigation feeling that everyone has lost, and that the lawyers
are the only ones who benefit from the process.
Id. In family law litigation in particular, ―‗[c]lients typically emerge from . . . settlements dazed and
angry‘ because they have unrealistic expectations about what they will get as a result of the process.‖
Strickland, supra note 12, at 980–81 (quoting Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPP.
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 317, 322–23 (2004)).
42. See THICH NHAT HANH, ANGER: WISDOM FOR COOLING THE FLAMES 23 (2001). Thich
Nhat Hanh, a Vietnamese Buddhist monk, counsels that although many believe they will feel better if
they can make their tormentor suffer, this is a fallacy. Id. He concludes that ―when you make the
other suffer, he will try to find relief by making you suffer more. The result is an escalation of
suffering on both sides. Both of you need compassion and help. Neither of you needs punishment.‖
Id.; see also Scott, supra note 4, at 646 (contending that interactions during divorce proceedings that
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use of the legal process, the painful result ―is usually only a dizzying spiral of
ever-increasing anger, attack, and counterattack.‖43 The ―litigation-as-war‖
model of conflict resolution exacts a psychological, emotional, and
physiological toll on the client—irrespective of the economic outcome, the
client is harmed by the litigation experience.
3. The Hidden Psychological and Emotional Costs of Resentment and Anger
Recent discoveries made by neuroscientists underscore the psychological
and emotional costs associated with the pursuit of vengeance. In the past,
neuroscientists believed that the functions of the structure that make up the
brain are fixed and that the brain is incapable of creating new neurons. 44
However, within the last ten years, neuroscientists have discovered that the
brain has ―stunning powers of neuroplasticity,‖ including the power to grow
new neurons and to develop new neural pathways.45 What this means is that
our thoughts actually change the hardwiring of the brain itself, including the
neuropathways of the brain. 46
To illustrate, consider the metaphor of a hill of virgin snow. 47 The first
child who sleds down the hill cuts a path through the snow. As more children
slide down the hill on that path, the path becomes trampled and deepens. If a
child decides to sled down another part of the hill, a new path is formed.
intensify feelings of anger and resentment ―create substantial impediments to cooperative
settlements‖ and ―reduce the prospects for a satisfactory agreement‖) (footnotes omitted).
43. WALSH, supra note 39, at 133.
44. SHARON BEGLEY, TRAIN YOUR MIND, CHANGE YOUR BRAIN: HOW A NEW SCIENCE
REVEALS OUR EXTRAORDINARY P OTENTIAL TO TRANSFORM OURSELVES 6 (2007). Begley states:
To some extent, the dogma was understandable. For one thing, the human brain
is made up of so many neurons and so many connections—an estimated 100
billion neurons making a total of some 100 trillion connections—that changing
it even slightly looked like a risky undertaking, on a par with opening up the
hard drive of a supercomputer and tinkering with a circuit or two on the
motherboard.
Id. at 7.
45. Id. at 8; DANIEL J. SIEGEL, THE MINDFUL BRAIN : REFLECTION AND ATTUNEMENT IN THE
CULTIVATION OF WELL-BEING 31–32 (2007) [hereinafter SIEGEL, THE MINDFUL BRAIN]; see also
COZOLINO, supra note 29, at 68 (noting that ―[t]here are approximately 12,000,000,000 neurons in
the brain, with between 10 and 100,000 synaptic connections each, creating an almost unlimited
number of associations among them‖).
46. BEGLEY, supra note 44, at 8; SIEGEL, THE MINDFUL BRAIN, supra note 45, at 31–32.
47. The snowy hill metaphor was used by Daniel Siegel to explain the relationship between the
mind (our thoughts) and the hardwiring of the brain, in a keynote address at a conference for health
care professionals in Anaheim, California, on April 29, 2007. See also BEGLEY, supra note 44, at 8
(concluding that ―[t]he actions we take can literally expand or contract different regions of the
brain‖); SIEGEL, THE MINDFUL BRAIN, supra note 45, at 32 (noting that where we direct our
thoughts ―will stimulate neural firing in specific areas, and they will become activated and change
their connections within the integrated circuits of the brain‖).
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Eventually, if everyone abandons the first path, with a fresh snow the old path
ceases to exist. The snowy hill is like the brain, with each thought either
deepening an old neuropathway or carving new terrain by developing new
neuropathways.48 Thus, in response to the thoughts to which we devote our
attention, the brain ―forges stronger connections in circuits that underlie one
behavior or thought and weakens the connections in others.‖49
The implications of these findings are disturbing when one considers what
often happens in adversarial litigation. The very act of obsessing over
thoughts of anger and revenge changes the hardwiring of the brain, as the
brain deepens the neuropathways that tell us the world is unfair and that we
have the right to be angry. 50 Other studies from the scientific community
corroborate these findings. Each time we think about an injustice, the brain
and sympathetic nervous system respond as if the initial hostile act were
happening all over again. 51 In fact, when we ruminate on an injustice, our
ruminations tend to fuel the fire of anger, heightening and reenergizing the
anger.52 Thus, the continued venting of anger often leaves us feeling more
enraged, not less.53
Moreover, with each retelling of the narrative about an injustice, we come
to believe more fervently in the injustice to which we have so ―innocently‖
been subjected, which has a self-fulfilling aspect. Studies performed in the
field of cognitive behavioral psychology suggest that when we believe
negative thoughts, we selectively interpret the world in a manner that
validates and affirms our ―private logic.‖ 54 Thus, a person who believes the
48. BEGLEY, supra note 44, at 8.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., id. at 9; SIEGEL, THE MINDFUL BRAIN, supra note 45, at 32. These findings from
neuroscience are consistent with Buddhist thought. As Thich Nhat Hanh explains: ―When you vent
your anger, you simply open the energy that is feeding your anger. The roots of anger are always
there, and by expressing anger like that, you are strengthening the roots of anger in yourself. That is
the danger of venting.‖ HANH, supra note 42, at 116.
51. LUSKIN, supra note 21, at 79; WALSH, supra note 39, at 79; Rollin McCraty et al., The
Effects of Emotions on Short-Term Power Spectrum Analysis of Heart Rate Variability, 76 AM. J.
CARDIOLOGY 1089, 1089–93 (1995); Charlotte vanOyen Witvliet et al., Granting Forgiveness or
Harboring Grudges: Implications for Emotion, Physiology, and Health, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 117, 122
(2001).
52. Michael E. McCullough et al., Rumination, Emotion, and Forgiveness: Three Longitudinal
Studies, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 490, 490 (2007); see also Don Ellinghausen, Jr.,
Venting or Vipassana? Mindfulness Meditation’s Potential for Reducing Anger’s Role in Mediation,
8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 63, 68 (2006).
53. WALSH, supra note 39, at 80.
54. See GERALD COREY, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COUNSELING AND PSYCHOTHERAPY
115–16 (6th ed. 2001). Aaron Beck, the father of the cognitive behavioral therapy movement,
conducted a number of studies that support this notion. Id. at 315–16. Alfred Adler, the father of the
Adlerian therapeutic model, calls this distorted logic ―private logic.‖ Id. at 115–16. Adlerian
psychologists conclude that one‘s negative thoughts are self-fulfilling because we seek to validate
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world is unfair and hostile will selectively interpret what is happening around
him in a manner that validates that belief. 55 And, because he is on some level
seeking to validate his beliefs, his negative thoughts about the world will tend
to be fulfilled as he attracts angry people into his experience. 56 In contrast, a
person who believes the world is just and good will selectively interpret the
world in a manner that validates that belief. 57
There is a neurological explanation for this filtering phenomenon. ―[T]he
vast majority of the information we acquire and encode is both outside of
conscious awareness and processed prior to conscious awareness . . . .‖58 This
is because ―[h]idden layers of neural processing . . . predigest and organize
our experience before it emerges into awareness.‖59 Thus, ―[i]n the few
hundredths of a second it takes for us to become consciously aware of [an
experience,] the hidden layers of neural processing shape and organize it,
trigger related networks, and select an appropriate presentation for conscious
awareness.‖60 These hidden layers of neural processing ―highlight some
aspects of experience while diminishing others, direct us to orient to certain
aspects of the environment, and completely block awareness of others. By
definition, the hidden layers are never directly seen.‖ 61

our private logic. Id. Studies in neuroscience also support the notion of selective perception,
contending that unconscious neural processing in the brain selects those aspects of an experience to
highlight and to block. See COZOLINO, supra note 29, at 157–62; see also MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA,
THE MIND ‘S PAST 26 (1998). Gazzaniga states that the left brain is like an ―interpreter‖ that weaves
a story about reality to convince us that we are in full control. Id.
55. See COREY, supra note 54, at 115–16.
56. Research in the field of critical discourse analysis helps explain this phenomenon. Much of
the meaning conveyed in conversation is transmitted through nonverbal and paralinguistic
communication. See Susan Jenkins & Isabel Parra, Multiple Layers of Meaning in an Oral
Proficiency Test: The Complementary Roles of Nonverbal, Paralinguistic, and Verbal Behaviors in
Assessment Decisions, 87 MODERN LANGUAGE J. 90, 91–95 (2003). We implicitly recognize and
interpret meaning by drawing from a vast inventory of behavioral practices that are widely shared by
members of a discourse community. Id. Certain nonverbal behaviors, such as smiling and eye
contact, are widely interpreted as conveying warmth and regard. These behaviors tend to attract
other people and are positively correlated with trust and liking. Id. at 92. Other nonverbal behaviors
are widely interpreted as conveying hostility, aggression, or anger, and tend to either repel people or
trigger a retaliatory act. See NAY, supra note 30, at 34 (listing the physical signs of anger). Some of
the physiological symptoms are internal, while others manifest outwardly, such as tightened muscles
in the face and neck region, a flushed face, shallow breathing, and dilated pupils. Id.
57. See COREY, supra note 54, at 115.
58. COZOLINO, supra note 29, at 158.
59. Id. at 159.
60. Id. at 160.
61. Id. at 161 (emphasis added); see also DOUGLAS STONE ET AL., DIFFICULT
CONVERSATIONS : HOW TO DISCUSS WHAT MATTERS MOST 30–33 (1999).
In Difficult
Conversations, the authors note how we each notice different things about an experience and yet
come away from the experience believing that we have ―the facts.‖ Id. This belief that we know
―the facts‖ is one cause of conflict.
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Because this constant stream of neural processing is unconscious, we have
no experience of the world other than our own conscious perception, which
represents only a single vantage point, or lens, through which to view a
complex world. 62 Because we see the world only through a single vantage
point, we make the false assumption ―that the world we experience and the
objective world are one and the same.‖63 We are blind to the reality that the
neuropathways in our brain selectively interpret the world, highlighting
aspects of ―reality‖ that reinforce our beliefs and ―completely blocking‖
aspects of ―reality‖ that do not fit into our belief systems.64 This egocentric
bias results in perceptual biases and distortions.65
Consider the significance of these scientific findings on the quality of a
client‘s life when the client participates in a lengthy and contentious litigation
proceeding. As the cycle of ―war‖ escalates, with each hostile act met with a
corresponding hostile act, the client replays in his mind the growing laundry
list of perceived wrongs he has endured and repeatedly ruminates about the
injustices visited upon him. As the client ruminates on such injustices, he is
likely to increasingly see himself as an innocent ―victim,‖ powerless to obtain
―justice.‖ This anger and resentment is not only likely to bleed into the
client‘s experiences in the world in general, but, over time, the angry, negative
experiences have a cumulative effect, deepening the brain‘s neuropathways
that believe the world is a hostile place and that the client is a helpless victim.
As the client‘s resentment grows over time, the client increasingly
experiences the world as hostile. 66 Thus, contentious litigation characterized
by hostility and aggression strengthens the client‘s perception that the world is
an unfair and hostile place, a place in which the client must fight to get what‘s
his.67 As the client pays greater attention to these thoughts, the client not only
selectively perceives the world as hostile but also is likely to create more
hostile experiences in his life. 68

62. COZOLINO, supra note 29, at 161–62.
63. Id. at 161.
64. See id. at 161–63.
65. Id. at 159.
66. See, e.g., NAY, supra note 30, at 42. Moreover, the more hostile the client‘s world view,
the less satisfying the relationships are in the client‘s life. Id. Healthy people generally avoid
significant contact with people who are habitually angry and vengeful. Id. Coworkers who are
forced to deal with the angry client will likely treat the angry client differently, whether in retaliation
for the client‘s anger or simply in self-defense. Id.
67. Interestingly, when the client eventually tires of assuming the role of victim, with the
lawyer being the rescuer, the client ―transfers responsibility for the perceived inequities of the system
to the attorney. Attorneys inevitably become part of the problem.‖ DAVID A. TRACY, A.B.A. CTR.
FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., THE ROLE OF THE LAWYER IN RELATION TO THE CLIENT: BOSS,
HUMBLE SERVANT OR DR. P HIL? 17 (2007).
68. See, e.g., NAY, supra note 30, at 42.
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4. The Adverse Health Costs Associated with Resentment and Anger
The vengeful client does not just incur psychological and emotional costs
by holding onto anger and resentment. A significant body of research in the
medical field provides compelling evidence of the adverse health effects of
holding onto anger and blame. The heart‘s rhythmic pattern, or heart rate
variability (HRV), is a barometer of our emotional states. 69 When someone is
angry or frustrated, the HRV pattern becomes rough and jagged, or
incoherent, and causes the sympathetic and parasympathetic branches of the
autonomic nervous system to become out of sync, 70 thereby increasing one‘s
blood pressure and heart rate.71 Preoccupation with angry thoughts, over
time, damages the heart and blood vessels by creating an overactive
sympathetic nervous system, which makes it difficult to calm down.72
The long-term health cost of holding onto anger is severe, with study after
study concluding that anger plays a lethal role in both heart disease and
cancer.73 For example, in one study, eighty percent of the participants who
69. McCraty et al., supra note 51, at 1089, 1092.
70. CHILDRE & ROZMAN, supra note 35, at 20–21.
71. LUSKIN, supra note 21, at 79. Luskin reports that in one study college students were asked
to actively recall a grudge they had against an offender and then to intersperse those periods by
imagining that they had forgiven the offender. Id. When thinking about the grudge, the students‘
blood pressure and heart rate rose and the subjects reported feeling uncomfortable and less in control.
Id. When imagining that they had forgiven their offenders, the subjects‘ blood pressure and heart
rate were not adversely affected, and the subjects reported greater feelings of relaxation and positive
emotions. Id. (citing vanOyen Witvliet et al., supra note 51, at 117–23); see also McCraty et al.,
supra note 51, at 1089–93.
72. CHILDRE & ROZMAN, supra note 35, at 22. A recent study of patients in Florida found a
2.8-fold increase in life-threatening cardiac arrhythmias in the thirty days after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. Omer L. Shedd et al., The World Trade Center Attack: Increased Frequency of
Defibrillator Shocks for Ventricular Arrhythmias in Patients Living Remotely from New York City,
44 J. AM. OF CARDIOLOGY 1265, 1266 (2004). Another study concluded that this is most likely
explained by a decrease in the calming protection normally provided by the parasympathetic nervous
system. Rachel Lampert et al., Heart Rate Variability During the Week of September 11, 2001, 288
J. AM. MED. ASS‘N 575, 575 (2002).
73. WALSH, supra note 39, at 80. Walsh notes that the ―harried person who is constantly busy
and irritable may be particularly prone to heart attacks, while people who carry an enormous residue
of rage but stuff it out of awareness may increase their risk of cancer.‖ Id.; see also DOC CHILDRE,
FREEZE FRAME : A SCIENTIFICALLY PROVEN TECHNIQUE FOR CLEAR DECISION MAKING AND
IMPROVED HEALTH 4–5 (Bruce Cryer ed., 2d ed. 1998). Childre cites a Harvard Medical School
study of heart attack survivors that found when the subjects got angry, their risk of another heart
attack was more than double of those subjects who remained calm. Id. at 4. Childre reports three
other ten-year studies that ―concluded that emotional stress was more predictive of death from cancer
and cardiovascular disease than smoking; people who were unable to effectively manage their stress
had a 40% higher death rate than non-stressed individuals.‖ Id. at 5. These health costs are as true
for people who suppress anger as they are for those who vent their anger. See MCKAY & ROGERS,
supra note 36, at 11 (citing Ray H. Rosenman, Health Consequences of Anger and Implications for
Treatment, in ANGER AND HOSTILITY IN CARDIOVASCULAR AND BEHAVIORAL DISORDERS
(Margaret A. Chesney & Ray H. Rosenman eds., 1985)).
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had heart disease were classified as ―type A‖ personalities, a personality type
associated with heightened aggression, impatience, and anger.74 Over an
eight-and-a-half-year study, the ―type A‖ subjects were twice as likely to have
heart attacks as the other subjects.75 In evaluating the data, the anger-hostility
characteristics proved to be ―the dominant characteristic among the coronary
prone type A behaviors.‖76
Other studies reflect that ―people who evidence higher degrees of blame
suffer more from a variety of illnesses,‖ not just heart disease and cancer. 77 In
one study, as part of a health evaluation, law students took a test measuring
hostility. 78 In a twenty-five-year follow-up study, a remarkable twenty
percent of those law students who scored in the top quartile on the hostility
scale were dead. 79 In contrast, those students who scored in the bottom
quartile on the same test exhibited only a five percent mortality rate. 80 In
short, although there may be temporary satisfaction in plotting revenge or
wallowing in blame, there is a significant long-term health cost to be paid.
5. Appeals to Morality or Economic Self-Interest Are Unlikely to Dissuade
the Vengeful Client
a. Resistance to Appeals to Morality
Not surprisingly, vengeful clients are often resistant to appeals based on
morality and even economic self-interest. Because the client‘s thirst for
vengeance is driven by underlying emotional pain, the client‘s reactive
emotional state is likely to blind the client to the finer points of moral
dialogue. Should the lawyer merely ask an angry, resentful client whether he
has considered the effect his actions might have on other people, this dialogue
has little potential to move a client from a fixed position. 81 Should the lawyer
74. MCKAY & ROGERS, supra note 36, at 11 (citing Rosenman, supra note 73).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. LUSKIN, supra note 21, at 78 (citing Linda K. George et al., Spirituality and Health: What
We Know, What We Need to Know, 19 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 102 (2000)); Sid Sarinopoulos,
Forgiveness and Physical Health: A Doctoral Dissertation Summary, WORLD OF FORGIVENESS,
Jan.–Feb. 2000, at 16, 18.
78. MCKAY & ROGERS, supra note 36, at 11.
79. Id.
80. Id.; see also Richard B. Shekelle et al., Hostility, Risk of Coronary Heart Disease, and
Mortality, 45 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 109, 113 (1983) (finding a correlation between high hostility
scores and increased mortality in a twenty-year follow-up study of nearly 2000 initially healthy
employees of the Western Electric Co.).
81. For example, if the lawyer were merely to ask an angry client to consider ―what would be
fair?‖, that question would be unlikely to spark a genuine dialogue about fairness—to an angry client,
revenge seems fair. See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 8, at 599 (advocating this approach to moral
dialogue as an aspect of the collaborative lawyering approach); see also id. at 610–11 (―[P]arties who
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decide to push the client a bit further by pointing out her own concerns about
the harmful effect of the client‘s proposed actions on other parties, the moral
dialogue is likely to generate defensiveness. Because the client is angry and
emotionally reactive, this more ―directive‖ 82 approach tends to lock clients
into defending their positions rather than candidly reflecting on the morality
of their actions.
Such power struggles 83 may result from the quandary the typical client
faces when, out of anger and hurt, he feels compelled to engage in conduct
that does not comport with his self-view as a moral, decent human being. The
client reconciles the vengeful conduct with his self-view as a decent human
being by portraying himself as an innocent victim who is somehow entitled to
wreak vengeance on an evil wrong-doer.84
Scientific and psychological research help explain why it is all too easy to
fall into an ―innocent victim‖ mentality. Due to a phenomenon called
―fundamental attribution error,‖ we tend to attribute our own mistakes and
flaws to the situation or environment, while explaining other people‘s
behavior by ascribing character flaws to them. 85 Moreover, we tend to ascribe
malicious intentions to others based on the depth of our subjective reactions to
the behavior.86 Because of these perceptual distortions we become polarized
in our thinking,87 labeling the other as ―bad‖ or ―corrupt‖ and ourselves as the
innocent victim. And, as we begin to catalogue a list of character flaws and
malicious intentions, the neuropathways in our brain begin to highlight those
aspects of ―reality‖ that reinforce our beliefs and minimize or completely

are most in need of ethical advice are probably among those least likely to commit to fair and
cooperative problem solving.‖).
82. Scholars who advocate what has been coined as the ―directive‖ or ―contextual‖ approach to
lawyering argue that, in the proper contexts, lawyers have the right and even the responsibility ―t o
assert control of moral issues that arise during legal representation‖ and to act in accordance with
their own moral convictions. Id. at 594.
83. A power struggle is a dialogue in which each participant attempts to persuade the other of
the validity of her position, rather than listening and being willing to learn from the other participant.
See, e.g., Richard K. Neumann, Jr., A Preliminary Inquiry into the Art of Critique, 40 HASTINGS L.J.
725, 759–61 (1989) (describing the power struggle within the student-teacher relationship in law
school).
84. This egoic defense mechanism is entirely unconscious, of course. See RUDOLF DREIKURS,
FUNDAMENTALS OF ADLERIAN PSYCHOLOGY 54–55 (1953).
85. See COZOLINO, supra note 29, at 163. For example, under the fundamental attribution error
phenomenon, when ―[w]e fail a test [it is] because we didn‘t have time to study or because the
professor wasn‘t very good; others fail because they are not very bright.‖ Id.
86. See STONE ET AL., supra note 61, at 46. Thus, if we are hurt by another person‘s actions,
we conclude that they intended to hurt us. Id. If we feel slighted, we assume they intended to slight
us. Id. ―Our thinking is so automatic that we aren‘t even aware that our conclusion is only an
assumption.‖ Id.
87. See COREY, supra note 54, at 311.
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block those aspects of ―reality‖ that do not support our belief systems. 88 In
psychological terms, this phenomenon is called ―belief perseverance.‖ 89
Therefore, a lawyer who attempts to persuade the client that his actions
are immoral is likely to be met with defensiveness. Due to perceptual biases
and distortions in the way the client interprets ―reality,‖ the client fervently
believes he is an innocent victim. And, because the desire for revenge is
unlikely to be satisfied until the underlying wound is healed, the client‘s selfview as a decent human being requires that he continue to defend and justify
his actions.
b. Resistance to Appeals to Economic Self-Interest
Even appeals to the client‘s economic self-interest are unlikely to
persuade the angry, vengeful client to relinquish the goal of using the legal
system as legalized war. Perhaps the most important reason why such appeals
tend to be unsuccessful is because they do not capture the heart of why an
angry client wants to use the legal system as a weapon for revenge. Anger is
only a secondary emotion that masks deeper emotional pain, such as betrayal,
guilt, shame, or fear.90 The drive for revenge is simply a misguided attempt to
heal the underlying emotional pain—the client believes the pain will
somehow dissipate if he can exact a pound of flesh. However, exacting
revenge provides only temporary satisfaction at best and doesn‘t actually heal
the underlying pain, so the drive for vengeance only continues and escalates
into a vicious cycle of attack and counterattack.91 Therefore, it is not
surprising that, although most lawyers seem to agree that it is appropriate to
88. See COZOLINO, supra note 29, at 163. Cozolino explains that the hidden layers of neural
processing
are conservative in the sense that they hold onto a way of understanding the
world that has, thus far, led to survival. This may, in part, explain why many
people with negative beliefs about themselves hold onto those beliefs with such
tenacity, and why racial prejudice often continues despite evidence to the
contrary.
Id. (citation omitted).
89. Id. at 163–64. Cozolino concludes: ―Belief perseverance is the enemy of neural plasticity.‖
Id. at 164. In other words, it is impossible to create new neuropathways to release anger and
resentment by clinging to set beliefs.
90. See MCKAY & ROGERS, supra note 36, at 16. However, without thoughtful prodding by
the lawyer, the typical client won‘t openly admit that anger is driving his litigation decisions and may
not even be wholly aware of his motivations.
91. See LUSKIN, supra note 21, at 27–28. Luskin notes that the desire for revenge is ―primarily
the result‖ of stress chemicals released by the body when the sympathetic nervous system is engaged.
Id. at 27. The desire for revenge is a primitive response of the reptilian brain rather than the result of
―careful or productive thinking. Our problem is the choices these stress chemicals offer us are
inadequate in helping to regain control of our emotional life. Simply put, these are poor choices.
They do not help us . . . come to grips with painful life experiences . . . .‖ Id.
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dissuade their clients from vengeful acts,92 they have been largely
unsuccessful in their efforts to do so. 93
c. The Lawyer’s Internal Dilemma
The relative lack of success lawyers have in dissuading clients from using
the legal system as legalized war may also stem, in part, from an internal
conflict as to whether it is appropriate for lawyers to impose their moral
values on their clients. After all, lawyers do not necessarily have a monopoly
on morality. 94 This is difficult terrain and an issue that has spawned a spirited
debate among legal scholars.95 One concern is that the lawyer might be so
persuasive, or overpowering, in her efforts to dissuade the client from conduct
she deems immoral or offensive that the lawyer‘s personal moral code will
override the client‘s moral code.96 Under agency law, as reflected in ethical
rules, the client is the principal and the lawyer is only the agent, 97 who ―shall
abide by a client‘s decisions concerning the objectives of representation,
92. Although there is clearly an economic justification for making baseless demands for child
custody, the anger and threats that are part and parcel of many divorces suggest that these kinds of
threats are fueled, in part, by anger and a desire for revenge—to exact financial punishment on a
spouse. See, e.g., Maldonado, supra note 13, at 449–52.
93. See, e.g., Altman, supra note 4, at 500. In Altman‘s study, although 95% of the surveyed
lawyers reported that they tried to dissuade their clients from using such a ploy, they reported an
underwhelming measure of success in their efforts, stating that their efforts were successful
somewhere between ―not often‖ and ―as often as not.‖ Id. at 536. Moreover, 61% of the responding
lawyers reported receiving a threat of custody litigation for more favorable financial terms at least
once in the preceding year. Id. at 499, 534. This statistic suggests that not only are lawyers often not
successful at dissuading their clients from taking such actions but that they agree to participate in
such a scheme rather than decline representation. Altman also concludes that this tactic, among
others, is fairly commonplace in certain jurisdictions. Id. at 495–97.
94. See Dinerstein et al., supra note 3, at 794–95 (cautioning against assuming that the lawyer‘s
ideas about right and wrong are necessarily correct, and noting that ―lawyers have no monopoly on
wisdom‖); see also BINDER ET AL., supra note 10, at 293–94 n.38.
95. The dilemma of whether to impose one‘s own views on a client has been widely debated.
Scholars who advocate what has been coined as the ―directive‖ or ―contextual‖ approach to
lawyering, argue that lawyers have the right, and even the responsibility, to act in accordance with
their own moral code when appropriate. RHODE, supra note 18, at 58; SIMON, supra note 18, at 138;
Luban, supra note 18, at 118. Other legal scholars criticize the ―directive‖ approach, in part, because
the lawyer should not presume that her moral code is inevitably ―right.‖ See, e.g., Symposium, supra
note 8, at 595–96 (Cochran argues that one of the ―troubling aspects‖ of the directive approach is that
the lawyer might be wrong.). But see id. at 617–20. Tremblay argues that lawyers need not be
concerned about imposing their own values on clients because values are not idiosyncratic but are,
rather, shared values about what is good. Id. at 618. He argues that disagreements about values are,
in reality, almost ―invariably about facts, not about values as such.‖ Id.
96. See, e.g., Dinerstein et al., supra note 3, at 796 (arguing that ―[t]he more able the client is to
make an independent judgment, the more appropriate‖ it is for the lawyer to urge her moral views on
the client).
97. See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1071 (1976) (arguing that the nature of the relationship dictates that the
lawyer should adopt the client‘s interests as her own).
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and . . . [who] shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are
to be pursued.‖98 Thus, if the client‘s professed goal is to obtain the best
possible financial settlement in a divorce, and warrior tactics might help
secure the best economic package, this dilemma creates an internal conflict
for the lawyer who wants to do the ―right‖ thing.99
This dilemma is exacerbated by the inherent tension between the duty of
loyalty to the client and the duty of fairness to other parties. 100 The notion that
―zealous‖ representation requires warrior-like behavior runs rampant within
the ranks of litigators.101 Indeed, ―[a]mong the metaphors that shape how
lawyers view themselves and are viewed by others, none exercises a more
powerful hold than the metaphor of the hired gun‖—a hired gun whose ―skills
are to be used solely and unreservedly to obtain what the client wants.‖102
98. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2002) (emphasis added). However, there
clearly is some room for the attorney to attempt to dissuade a client from insisting on taking action
on an issue that is otherwise within the client‘s province. For example, the comments note that
although ―lawyers usually defer to the client regarding such questions as . . . concern for third
persons who might be adversely affected,‖ there is room for disagreement. Id. at 1.2 cmt. 2.
Although the ―[r]ule does not prescribe how such disagreements are to be resolved,‖ lawyers are
encouraged to ―consult with the client and seek a mutually acceptable resolution of the
disagreement.‖ Id. at 1.2(a) cmt. 2. Moreover, lawyers are specifically encouraged to ―refer not only
to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors.‖ Id. at 2.1.
Thus, ―[i]t is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in giving
advice. Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral and ethical considerations impinge
upon most legal questions and may decisively influence how the law will be applied.‖ Id. at 2.1 cmt.
2.
99. The fact that many lawyers narrowly view ―winning‖ solely in economic terms makes them
even less likely to pursue moral dialogue if the client‘s desire for warrior tactics seems likely to result
in a better economic result. See Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law: What It Is and Why Lawyers
Need to Know About It, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING
PROFESSION 187, 192 (Dennis P. Stolle et al. eds., 2000).
100. For example, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct instruct lawyers to ―act with
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client‘s
behalf.‖ MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2002). Indeed, the rules governing
conflicts of interest are premised on the principle that loyalty is an ―essential element[] in the
lawyer‘s relationship to a client.‖ Id. at 1.7 cmt. 1. However, although ―[r]esponsibility to a client
requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, . . . that responsibility
does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of third persons.‖ Id. at 4.4 cmt. 1. Thus, the
Model Rules prohibit lawyers from using ―means that have no substantial purpose other than
to . . . burden a third person,‖ id. at 4.4, from making frivolous discovery requests, id. at 3.4(d), from
making ―false statement[s] of material fact or law‖ to third parties, id. at 4.1(a), or from offering false
evidence or making false statements to tribunals, id. at 3.3(a)(1)(3).
101. See Tesler, supra note 99, at 189–92.
102. Allegretti, supra note 9, at 749. Allegretti observes:
From the first day of law school, in class and out, in what is said and left
unsaid, prospective lawyers are trained to see themselves as the hired guns of
clients . . . . Their personal values and beliefs are to play no role in how they do
their job. They owe their clients uncompromising loyalty. If they have moral
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This notion is even reinforced by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
which, to date, have declined to expressly condemn the use of ―offensive
tactics‖ or the treatment of other parties with a lack of ―courtesy or
respect.‖103
The lawyer‘s internal conflict is made even more difficult by the typical
client‘s prevarications about his motivations. Questions about morality are
often not clear-cut but are, rather, shaded with gray. 104 Like the client in the
vignette, many clients change their minds about what they want during
litigation, particularly a client whose judgment is clouded by anger. For
example, a client who initially states that he is not interested in assuming
primary custody of his children is entitled to change his mind and is certainly
entitled to be conflicted about what he really wants. Moreover, as the lawyer
listens to the client‘s narrative of victimization, the internal tension is likely to
become even more acute as the lawyer begins to empathize with the client‘s
plight.105 With greater empathy and identification with the client, efforts to

qualms about a client, or about the means needed to achieve a client‘s goals,
then they should refuse to take the case. But once they take a case they are in,
all the way in, and the client has the right to expect them to do everything
possible to win the case, subject only to the constraints of the law and the codes
of the legal profession.
Id.
103. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2002). The comment instructs
lawyers to act ―with zeal in advocacy upon the client‘s behalf,‖ and then explains that ―[t]he lawyer‘s
duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive tactics or preclude the
treating of all persons involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect.‖ Id. (emphasis added).
By failing to prohibit offensive tactics or require courtesy and respect, the language seems to reflect
the drafters‘ ambivalence about offensive conduct. See LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG,
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 291–92 (2d ed. 2008).
104. See Symposium, supra note 8, at 621–22. Tremblay observes that clients ―do not present
unambiguous stories of injustice, corruption, or unconscionability.‖ Id. at 621. Instead,
[t]he rich guy has excuses; he has accusations about the poor guy; he has a
history that makes his case far more complicated. Justice is on my side, he says.
The lawyer may suspect that all of this is just twaddle, but for him to betray his
client he must be sure—ever so sure—that it is indeed twaddle. I suspect that
lawyers are very seldom so sure.
Id. at 622; see also BINDER ET AL., supra note 10, at 295. Binder concludes that ―moral tensions
arrive in shades of gray, and individuals are very seldom openly or admittedly immoral. A client
who suggests a scheme that you consider immoral will undoubtedly offer a reasoned defense based
on assumed facts which you cannot be sure are wrong.‖ Id.
105. See Allegretti, supra note 9, at 766 (contending that, as lawyers ―become intimates of their
clients, . . . their own moral values come more and more to resemble those of their most important
clients, so that over time their professional values are no longer truly their own‖); see also
Symposium, supra note 8, at 612 (noting that ―many attorneys acknowledged shifting or suspending
judgment in the course of representing clients‖).
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dissuade the vengeful client increasingly begin to seem like unjustified
interference with the client‘s autonomy and dignity. 106
The lawyer‘s internal conflict about dissuading the client from vengeful
acts may also be a reflection of the reality that efforts to dissuade the client
from immoral acts are likely not only to be unsuccessful but also to strain the
lawyer-client relationship. Because a client is not likely to be receptive to
rational arguments based on morality or even economic self-interest, such a
dialogue risks jeopardizing the trust and respect that is essential to a strong
lawyer-client relationship. 107 When defending the legitimacy of his position,
the client is likely to fall prey to polarized thinking, concluding that the
lawyer is not ―on my side‖ because ―whoever isn‘t with me is against me.‖ 108
Thus, such a dialogue has the distinct potential to impair trust and to alienate a
client on whom the lawyer is economically dependent.109 Even if the client
decides to continue working with the lawyer, the awkwardness of the dialogue
may well have a crippling effect on the lawyer-client relationship.110
III. THE LAWYER AS A FACILITATOR FOR HEALING
A. Addressing the Client’s Emotional Pain and Self-Interest Is a Better
Approach
Lawyers have extraordinary potential to facilitate healing. As Chief
Justice Warren Burger once lamented: ―The entire legal profession—lawyers,
judges, law teachers—has become so mesmerized with the stimulation of the
courtroom contest that we tend to forget that we ought to be healers—healers
of conflicts.‖111 When working with an angry client who may be blinded by
106. See Symposium, supra note 8, at 623–24.
107. See Stephen L. Pepper, Autonomy, Community, and Lawyers’ Ethics, 19 CAP. U. L. REV.
939, 944–57 (1990) (discussing the risks involved in moral dialogue); see also Dinerstein et al.,
supra note 3, at 802 (recognizing that ineffective moral dialogue risks jeopardizing the client‘s trust
in the lawyer).
108. See COREY, supra note 54, at 311.
109. See Dinerstein et al., supra note 3, at 793–94 (―[L]awyers who contemplate beginning
such dialogues will hesitate because of their own fear of losing clients . . . .‖).
110. See Robert J. Condlin, “What’s Love Got to Do With It?”—“It’s Not Like They’re Your
Friends for Christ’s Sake”: The Complicated Relationship Between Lawyer and Client, 82 NEB. L.
REV. 211, 281 (2003). Condlin questions why a client would welcome ―moral critique and
exhortation‖ from a lawyer he ―hardly know[s].‖ Id. Condlin wonders whether it isn‘t ―perhaps a
little impertinent, after all, to tell people . . . who have come to you for legal help, that their moral
perspectives are narrow or self-centered, mostly because they are not the same as yours.‖ Id.
(footnote omitted).
111. Warren E. Burger, The State of Justice, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1984, at 62, 66; see also Richard
M. Calkins, Caucus Mediation—Putting Conciliation Back Into the Process: The Peacemaking
Approach to Resolution, Peace, and Healing, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 259, 272 (2006) (―[M]any conclude
that peacemaking is the highest calling in the legal profession and one of the highest callings in
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the desire for vengeance, a lawyer is more likely to be successful in helping
the client when she directly addresses the source of the client‘s emotional
pain, and the client‘s self-interest, rather than attempting to ―reason‖ with the
client. And, by helping the client release the anger that is driving the desire
for vengeance, the lawyer is more likely to succeed in helping the client
realistically weigh the advantages and disadvantages of a litigation strategy
that will best serve his economic and quality-of-life objectives.
Although the lawyer will likely need to persuade the client to entertain the
possibility of releasing some of the anger that has impaired his ability to
assess his legal options, the dialogue outlined below in this Article avoids
many of the problems inherent in reasoned appeals based on logic and
morality. Persuading a client to entertain the prospect of releasing the anger
that has affected the client‘s clarity and quality of life does not raise the same
troubling internal dilemma of whether it is appropriate to impose the lawyer‘s
personal moral values on the client. Although some might argue that letting
go of anger and hostility is itself a moral virtue, the dialogue urged in this
Article does not invite the lawyer to impose her personal moral beliefs on the
client by sparring about the morality of anger. Instead, the lawyer‘s efforts to
persuade the client focus on the client‘s underlying emotions and concern for
the client‘s ultimate well-being.
To illustrate the distinction, a lawyer who engages in a moral discussion
with an angry client is likely to ask the client to focus his thoughts on other
people. The lawyer might ask the client to consider ―what is fair‖ or, in a
child custody dispute, to consider the effect of the client‘s actions on his
children. The lawyer might even attempt to openly discuss whether the
proposed strategy is moral. In contrast, the dialogue outlined in this Article
invites the lawyer to focus the discussion on the client’s underlying interests
and well-being. As discussed in greater detail in Part IV of this Article, the
lawyer begins the dialogue by asking the client to identify his ultimate
objectives and expressly invites the client to consider quality-of-life as well as
economic objectives. The lawyer then uses the client‘s professed quality-oflife objectives as a starting point to discuss the lawyer‘s concern that the
client‘s anger and frustration is likely to thwart his efforts to attain those
objectives.112
life.‖); Edward D. Re, The Lawyer as Counselor and the Prevention of Litigation, 31 CATH. U. L.
REV. 685, 690–92 (1982). Judge Re argues that the legal profession needs to reprioritize its values
by recognizing that one of the most important roles a lawyer has is that of counselor—a counselor
who ―serves as an instrument of peace.‖ Id. at 691.
112. Although the discussion is focused on the client‘s self-interest rather than the interests of
other parties, by reducing the level of anger and frustration the client is experiencing, the client is
also likely to back down from insisting on litigation strategies that are borne out of the desire for
vengeance. Thus, the client might ultimately end up choosing to act in a manner the lawyer
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Nonetheless, one might argue that this is merely a semantic distinction,
and that it is just as presumptuous and paternalistic for a lawyer to persuade a
client to release the anger that is driving his litigation decisions as it is for the
lawyer to impose her moral values on the client. However, the prospect of the
paternalistic lawyer persuading a client to release anger and blame is not
troubling for several reasons. First, only the client can make the ultimate
decision to release the anger and resentment he has directed against the other
party; it is simply not possible for any lawyer to compel an unwilling client to
choose to release the emotions that are causing the client pain. It is entirely
possible, of course, that an overly zealous lawyer might unwittingly persuade
a reluctant client to feign a change of heart.113 However, the dialogue
presented below in this Article114 requires a genuine self-exploration that
cannot be forced or easily feigned. The choice of whether to release the anger
and resentment that is troubling the client rests, ultimately, with the client. 115
Of course, as with any sensitive issue that arises between a lawyer and
client, it is possible that an overbearing lawyer with poor interpersonal skills
could so aggressively attempt to force the client into letting go of anger that
her efforts would alienate the client and weaken the lawyer-client relationship.
However, this is a potential risk inherent within any sensitive dialogue
between a lawyer and a client.
Moreover, it is unlikely that the lawyer‘s efforts to persuade a client to let
go of the anger and resentment that is impairing the client‘s quality of life
would jeopardize the trust that is essential to the lawyer-client relationship.
Unlike moral dialogue, the lawyer who collaborates with the client in this
manner is not attempting to convince the client that he is ―wrong‖ to feel the
way he does. Therefore, this dialogue is not as likely to culminate in a power
struggle that would lock the client into a defensive posture. As a
compassionate ally, the lawyer acknowledges that the client is in pain,
educates the client about the hidden costs of holding onto anger, and helps the
client find an outlet to heal the pain. In fact, because the lawyer is
acknowledging the client‘s pain and offering a solution to alleviate that pain,

considers to be moral, even though the lawyer and client might never have expressly discussed the
morality of the client‘s actions on third parties.
113. When a client feels compelled to feign a change of heart in order to work with a lawyer,
then clearly the lawyer has overstepped the boundaries of acceptable persuasion. The client would
not reap any of the benefits of a genuine release from anger, and the dialogue itself would strain the
lawyer-client relationship.
114. See discussion infra Part IV.
115. See Robert D. Enright & Bruce A. Kittle, Forgiveness in Psychology and Law: The
Meeting of Moral Development and Restorative Justice, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1621, 1630 (2000)
(making a similar argument about working with clients to help them find forgiveness).
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such a discussion, when conducted by a competent lawyer, should strengthen
the lawyer-client relationship rather than weaken it.
This sense of working together as allies also helps minimize the internal
tension between the lawyer‘s duty of loyalty to the client and the duty of
fairness to other parties. Faced with evidence from the fields of science and
cognitive psychology that documents the costs of holding onto anger, there is
arguably no higher service a lawyer could perform for a client than helping
the client release the anger that drives the desire for revenge. As Ellen Bass
so eloquently expressed: ―There‘s a part of everything living that wants to
become itself—the tadpole into the frog, the chrysalis into the butterfly, a
damaged human being into a whole one.‖ 116 There is, within every vengeful
client, a longing for healing, a longing to be freed of the anger that is
poisoning his quality of life. 117
Neither should a concern for the client‘s autonomy present an ethical or
moral dilemma for the lawyer who works with the vengeful client. An angry
client‘s insistence on escalating conflict through unethical or arguably
immoral ploys implicates no values that are worthy of deference. 118 Indeed,
because of the rigidity of the client‘s thinking when in a state of anger or fear,
the vengeful client can view his options only through a ―narrow-angle lens‖ 119
that is stuck on a single perspective—that of vengeance. In contrast, when the
lawyer helps a client let go of some of the anger and emotional pain that are
driving the quest for revenge, the lawyer is, in effect, paying the ultimate

116. KEEVA, supra note 17, at 31 (quoting ELLEN BASS & LAURA DAVIS, THE COURAGE TO
HEAL: A GUIDE FOR WOMEN SURVIVORS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 156 (1988)).
117. See DESMOND MPILO TUTU, NO FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS 103–04 (1999). It is
this truth—that there lies within each of us a longing for, and capability of, healing—that served as
the guiding force behind the healing work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South
Africa. Id. Bishop Tutu relays the story of a young activist in the South African Black
Consciousness Movement who was frequently captured and routinely tortured by the South African
Security Police. Id. This remarkable young activist clung to this truth even as the police were
torturing him. Id. While being tortured, he would remind himself: ―[T]hese are God‘s children and
yet they are behaving like animals. They need us to help them recover the humanity they have lost.‖
Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
118. As moral philosophers such as David Luban and Deborah Rhode have argued, a client‘s
autonomy has no intrinsic value in and of itself. See Luban, supra note 18, at 118; Symposium, supra
note 8, at 606–07. Instead, the importance of a client‘s autonomy ―derives from the values it fosters,
such as personal creativity, initiative, and responsibility. If a particular client objective does not, in
fact, promote those values, or does so only at much greater cost to third parties, then deference to that
objective is not ethically justifiable.‖ Symposium, supra note 8, at 606 (footnote omitted). But see
Fried, supra note 97, at 1074 (arguing that there is moral value itself in ―preserv[ing] and
express[ing] the autonomy of [the] client vis-à-vis the legal system‖).
119. CHILDRE & ROZMAN, supra note 35, at 13; see also LUSKIN, supra note 21, at 27. Luskin
notes that when the brain is in survival mode, stress chemicals attempt to keep us alive by diverting
our energy from the thinking and reasoning parts of the brain to the reptilian brain. Id. at 128.
Unfortunately, this fixation on ―fight or flight‖ limits our ability to think. Id.
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deference to client autonomy. 120 In the expansive state that results from the
act of letting go of negative emotions, the client‘s perspective about his
options is similarly likely to expand.121 From the vantage point of a clear and
open mind, the client can consider a number of different perspectives and how
they might impact his options in terms of litigation and settlement strategies.
Thus, the lawyer can more effectively help the client evaluate which options
will best serve his short-term and long-term objectives.
B. Lawyers Are Ideally Situated to Help the Vengeful Client
Lawyers are ideally situated to respond to the call for healing. 122 An
angry client who seeks to exact revenge through the legal process is a client
whose call for help transcends the legal issues involved—this is a client in
crisis.123 When a vengeful client reaches the point where he seeks the help of
a lawyer, arguably at least three of the four essential human biological
needs124 are in chaos: the need for certainty and comfort,125 the need for love
and connection,126 and the need for validation.127 Not surprisingly, an angry
120. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY 43 (1994). Shaffer and Cochran argue that a lawyer who engages the client in a
discussion about the moral implications of his actions may have ―a greater respect for the autonomy
of the client than lawyers who lead clients to follow their initial and angriest and most selfish
inclinations‖—that is, ―if autonomy includes taking informed, thoughtful direction in life.‖ Id.
121. See SIEGEL & HARTZELL, supra note 28, at 155–56. Seigel and Hartzell contend that
making decisions from the prefrontal cortex rather than from the limbic system ―allows for
mindfulness, flexibility in our responses, and an integrating sense of self-awareness.‖ Id. at 156.
122. See Maldonado, supra note 13, at 486.
123. See Gerald R. Williams, Negotiation as a Healing Process, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 18
(1996). Williams argues ―that the lawyer-client relationship does help to stabilize clients while they
are in crisis and to reduce the likelihood they will ‗act out‘ in ways that are destructive to themselves
or others.‖ Id. Williams notes that clients who are in conflict ―typically choose between two courses
of action. One is self-help, with its attendant risks. The other is to submit the matter (and one‘s own
self) to a lawyer.‖ Id. He concludes that the lawyer-client relationship is significant because it can
offer ―crucial support to people in conflict that goes far beyond the legal protection lawyers provide,
especially when lawyers are attuned to the nature of conflict and the processes by which it can be
resolved.‖ Id.
124. See ANTHONY ROBBINS & CLOÉ MADANES, ULTIMATE RELATIONSHIP P ROGRAM :
ACTION BOOK 23–29 (2005). Robbins and Madanes contend that human motivation is driven by the
need to fulfill four basic needs, and that these needs ―are the primal forces which shape all of our
choices.‖ Id. at 23. In addition to the four basic biological needs that are essential for everyone‘s
survival, they suggest two additional spiritual needs, which are ―essential to human fulfillment‖: the
need for growth, and the need to make a contribution. Id. at 30–31.
125. The need for certainty has been described as a ―fundamental survival instinct, common to
all animals as well.‖ Id. at 24.
126. Id. at 29. During adversarial litigation, the lawyer presumably fulfills, in part, the need for
connection. However, adversarial litigation arises precisely because of the splintering and
disintegration of an important connection in the client‘s life.
127. The need for ―significance‖ entails the need to feel special and important in some way and
to feel proud of one‘s accomplishments. Id. at 27. This need is also in chaos during adversarial
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client who takes the ultimate step of seeking legal help to engage in
adversarial litigation has often given up hope that he can solve the problems
in his life by himself.
The lawyer, therefore, represents hope. Indeed, the mere act of deciding
to seek the help of a lawyer provides the client with some measure of hope. 128
This phenomenon is separate and apart from the support a client might receive
from an encouraging and competent lawyer. Of course, due to the popular
image of lawyers as hired guns, and the vengeful client‘s limited capacity to
envision solutions that do not involve warfare, the client‘s hope may well be
that the lawyer assume the role of gladiator. However, the task of the lawyer
is to redirect that energy into a more positive hopeful vision for the client‘s
future—a future in which the client effects a resolution to the conflict that will
ultimately prove to be more satisfying than ―war.‖
As a beacon of hope, the lawyer is uniquely situated to address both the
legal alternatives available to the client and the humanistic concerns raised by
the client‘s anger and frustration.129 The idea that lawyers should address
non-legal concerns while counseling clients is not new or novel. 130 Clients do
not typically walk into their lawyers‘ offices with legal questions that are
neatly isolated from the rest of their lives. Clients are complex human beings,
and their legal questions often have nonlegal ramifications that competent
lawyers should encourage the client to address. Thus, discussions between a
lawyer and client must necessarily involve aspects of counseling in order for
the lawyer to facilitate the client‘s ability to engage in effective problemsolving.
When a lawyer counsels a vengeful client whose thinking is impaired by
emotional pain, the need to address the humanistic concerns is particularly

litigation, such as a divorce, because most people view divorce as a personal failure rather than a
success.
128. See C. R. Snyder et al., Hope Theory: Updating a Common Process for Psychological
Change, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CHANGE : PSYCHOTHERAPY PROCESSES & PRACTICES
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 128, 133 (C.R. Snyder & Rick E. Ingram eds., 2000).
129. Although lawyers are ideally situated to address the legal and humanistic concerns raised
by their clients‘ anger and emotional reactivity, many lawyers have neither been trained to address
their clients‘ emotionality nor have they focused on the need to address these issues. See, e.g.,
Schneider & Mills, supra note 4, at 619. The law school curriculum and continuing legal education
programs should provide training in addressing this important issue.
130. Indeed, each of the major legal textbooks on client counseling emphasizes the importance
of the lawyer‘s role in helping clients identify the non-legal consequences of their legal options. See,
e.g., ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, AND
NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION 255–57 (1990); BINDER ET AL., supra note
10, at 9; COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 6–9; G. NICHOLAS HERMAN ET AL., LEGAL
COUNSELING AND NEGOTIATING: A PRACTICAL APPROACH 71–72 (2001). The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct also provide room for lawyers to discuss non-legal considerations when
counseling clients. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2002).

2009]

DILEMMA OF THE VENGEFUL CLIENT

509

acute. Indeed, the lawyer cannot competently perform her responsibilities as
an advisor to the client by focusing solely on the legal issues while ignoring
the humanistic concerns.131 Due to biochemical changes in the brain, 132 the
angry, frustrated client suffers from perceptual distortions133 and a limited
ability to engage in effective problem-solving.134 It would therefore be naïve
to suggest that a lawyer could competently advise such a client without
addressing the humanistic concerns that are so clearly imbedded within the
legal decisions.
Nor is it practical to suggest that the client should simply seek the help of
a mental health professional to address the client‘s anger and resentment, and
limit the lawyer‘s role to a discussion of the legal issues. 135 Although a
vengeful client might ideally seek the assistance of a mental health
professional while undergoing legal counseling, there is, to some clients, a
stigma in seeking the help of a mental health professional; for other clients,
the daunting prospect of a long, drawn-out therapeutic process dissuades them
from seeking help.136
This is not to suggest that the lawyer is a substitute for a mental health
professional, an accountant, or any other professional who might be of service
to the client. Just as a corporate lawyer who advises a client about the tax
consequences of a proposed business decision may not be a substitute for an
accountant, so, too, the lawyer who helps a client reduce the level of anger
and frustration that is driving his decisions is not a substitute for a mental
health professional. Nor is this Article suggesting that the lawyer assume the
role of a mental health professional while facilitating this process. 137 Unlike a
131. See, e.g., BINDER ET AL., supra note 10, at 9; Symposium, supra note 8, at 608 (identifying
survey evidence suggesting that ―lawyers significantly underestimate the extent to which clients
would welcome non-legal advice‖).
132. See COZOLINO, supra note 29, at 23–25; SIEGEL, THE DEVELOPING MIND, supra note 28,
at 10.
133. See COZOLINO, supra note 29, at 157–62.
134. See CAINE & CAINE, supra note 31, at 76; see SIEGEL, THE DEVELOPING MIND, supra
note 28, at 259; SIEGEL & HARTZELL, supra note 28, at 155–56.
135. Although ideally the client should seek the help of a mental health professional, as a
practical matter, many clients refuse to do so. See Maldonado, supra note 13, at 486.
136. Arguably, if a client is unwilling to seek the help of a mental health professional, the client
would likewise be unwilling to engage in a discussion with his lawyer aimed at letting go of anger.
However, the client‘s own lawyer would not have the stigma some clients associate with mental
health counseling. Moreover, the lawyer can make direct appeals to the client‘s self-interest, with the
potential for psychological and emotional relief in the short-term. These appeals can allay the
client‘s concern that therapy is a long, drawn-out process in which the client does not have the ―time‖
to engage.
137. Indeed, many lay people have successfully unbound themselves from anger through the
process of cognitive questioning that this Article has adapted, in part, from an inquiry called ―The
Work,‖ as originated by BYRON KATIE, LOVING WHAT IS: FOUR QUESTIONS THAT CAN CHANGE
YOUR LIFE (2002).
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psychotherapist, the lawyer is not being asked to revisit a client‘s personal
history in an effort to heal the psychic injuries from the client‘s past. Nor is
the lawyer being asked to apply a therapeutic modality while helping the
client evaluate and heal the myriad of emotional issues with which a client
might presently be struggling. 138
Instead, in the dialogue described in Part IV of this Article, the lawyer‘s
role is specifically targeted toward educating the client about the costs of
anger and asking questions that can help the client release the emotional
reactivity that is impairing the client‘s ability to evaluate which legal options
best serve his objectives. Moreover, because the dialogue is Socratic in
nature,139 the lawyer is well-suited to lead the client through this process.
IV. COUNSELING THE VENGEFUL CLIENT
A. Recognizing the Vengeful Client
The vengeful client is not likely to jump up and brazenly admit that he
wants to use the legal process for vengeance. Instead, the vengeful client will
more likely have reasoned explanations for making what might seem to be
unethical, immoral, or unwise demands in litigation. 140 How, then, might the
lawyer recognize when a client‘s thinking is impaired by anger and
resentment? The signs of vengeance are likely to become evident early in the
client meeting, as the client provides the lawyer with a preliminary
explanation of the legal problem and his objectives and begins to describe a
timeline of the relevant events. At times, however, the signs of vengeance

138. Ideally, an angry, embittered client who is in crisis should be working with a mental health
professional, and lawyers should recommend this course of action to such clients. Although the
cognitive inquiry described in this Article is consistent with such therapeutic modalities as cognitive
and rational emotive therapy and Freudian psychology, it is significantly more limited in scope than
the work that psychotherapists employ with their clients.
139. See Enright & Kittle, supra note 115, at 1626–27 (noting that a new cognitive awareness
typically precedes the emotional feelings that come from the release of anger associated with
forgiveness); Linda Ross Meyer, Forgiveness and Public Trust, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1515, 1521–
22 (2000).
140. For example, a client who demands to threaten child custody as a negotiating ploy might
argue that this strategy will enable him to obtain a better financial package. However, if the client
does not genuinely want primary physical custody of the children, there is clearly something else
going on beneath the surface. Although there may well be an economic basis for making baseless
demands for child custody, such threats are often fueled, in part, by anger and a desire for revenge—
to exact financial punishment on a spouse who deserves to be punished. See Scott, supra note 4, at
646–47 (concluding that ―spite‖ is a ―familiar aspect of divorce negotiations‖); Alexandria Zylstra,
The Road from Voluntary Mediation to Mandatory Good Faith Requirements: A Road Best Left
Untraveled, 17 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 69, 71 (2001) (―Children are frequently the
unknowing victims in the adversarial process, as the parents‘ anger and frustrations heighten, often
resulting in using the children as bargaining chips for financial advantages.‖).
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might become evident only during a follow-up meeting, when the client
appears to be emotionally reactive, adamantly insisting upon litigation tactics
that appear hostile, aggressive, or unrealistic.
In addition to the more obvious nonverbal signs of anger, 141 the lawyer
should be attuned to the client‘s language. A vengeful client will tend to
speak in terms of blame, portraying himself as a hapless victim and the other
party as a ―bad‖ person (e.g., ―I tried my best, and look at how she‘s repaid
me‖). The vengeful client will tend to make all-or-nothing blanket statements
that reflect polarized thinking (e.g., ―She is a selfish [expletive],‖ or ―I‘m
getting screwed here‖). 142 The lawyer should also be alert to verbal leaks that
indicate the goal of revenge (e.g., ―[The other party] is only getting what he or
she deserves‖) or an element of glee at the thought of the other party‘s
response to a hostile litigation strategy (e.g., ―Let‘s see how he or she feels
when . . .‖).
The client‘s underlying motive of vengeance should also become apparent
when the lawyer and client discuss the client‘s objectives and the advantages
and disadvantages of various legal alternatives. The client‘s professed
objectives may appear on their face to implicate the goal of vengeance (e.g.,
―I want to take her to the cleaners‖). Even when the goal of vengeance is not
that explicit, there is commonly an element of reactivity and distrust in the
vengeful client‘s reasoning and demands. 143 The client may express the fear
that if he doesn‘t aggressively protect his financial interests by playing
―hardball,‖ then he will be taken to the proverbial cleaners by the other
party.144
The client may insist on making demands the lawyer perceives to be
irrational and counterproductive. 145 The vengeful client is likely to be
unreceptive to the lawyer‘s discussion of alternatives that do not involve
warfare and to minimize or ignore the lawyer‘s warnings of the risks he incurs

141. Although some of the physiological symptoms of anger are internal, others manifest
outwardly, such as a raised voice, tightened muscles in the face and neck region, a flushed face,
shallow breathing, and dilated pupils. See NAY, supra note 30, at 34 (listing the physical signs of
anger).
142. See COREY, supra note 54, at 311 (defining polarized thinking as interpreting our
experiences in ―either-or-extremes,‖ and labeling events in ―black or white terms‖).
143. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 4, at 646–47.
144. It may well be true that the other party might try to take advantage of the client and that
the client might have to aggressively protect his financial interests. This Article is not suggesting
that the lawyer must dissuade a client from seeking to obtain the best financial relief the client can
lawfully achieve. Instead, this Article suggests that the polarized thinking of an angry, vengeful
client can result in a distorted perception of the danger posed by the other party and of the risks
involved in pursuing various litigation options.
145. See, e.g., Maldonado, supra note 13, at 467–68.
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by escalating the conflict. 146 The vengeful client is also likely to be
dismissive of the potential negative impact of his actions on third parties,
including his children and other family members. 147
The lawyer can also recognize the goal of vengeance by paying attention
to her own behavior. If the lawyer begins to notice that she is either
expending energy trying to encourage the client to ―listen to reason‖ or is
fighting the desire to argue with the client, then it is quite possible that the
client‘s emotional reactivity is blinding the client to his own self-interest. 148
Because the client‘s underlying emotions may be impeding his ability to
engage in a reasoned discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of
various legal alternatives, the lawyer is likely to experience some degree of
frustration when attempting to engage a vengeful client in a rational
discussion.
B. Beginning the Client Conference: Setting the Stage
1. Creating an Appropriate Role Expectation
The American system of justice is widely perceived to be built on the idea
of retribution, punishment, and a win-lose mentality.149 Movies, television,
and news articles often portray lawyers as slick tricksters eager to engage in
war.150 The Internet has also become a breeding ground for perceptions of
146. See Scott, supra note 4, at 648; see also CAINE & CAINE, supra note 31, at 76; SIEGEL &
HARTZELL, supra note 28, at 155–56.
147. See Robert H. Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining: The Limits on Private Ordering, in THE
RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CONFLICT 364, 367–70 (John M. Eekelaar & Sanford N. Katz eds., 1984).
148. See Roger A. Ballou, Adlerian-Based Responses for the Mental Health Counselor to the
Challenging Behaviors of Teens, 24 J. MENTAL HEALTH COUNSELING 154, 156–57 (2002). Ballou
suggests that therapists examine their own emotional responses to their clients‘ beha vior as a means
of helping them identify their clients‘ hidden goals. Id.
149. For example, a recent edition of the American Bar Association‘s Litigation Manual
counsels that, when communicating with clients, lawyers should tell the client ―not to think of the
attorney-client relationship as you assisting her in her fight against the other side but to realize that it
is both of you against them.‖ A.B.A., THE LITIGATION MANUAL, FIRST SUPPLEMENT 49 (Priscilla
Anne Schwab ed., 3d ed. 2007); see also Re, supra note 111, at 690–92. Re argues that, although
counseling clients is one of the more important roles lawyers have, the public is misled ―into
believing that the lawyer‘s only, or principal, function is representation in the adversary process.‖ Id.
at 691 (quoting Louis M. Brown & Harold A. Brown, What Counsels the Counselor? The Code of
Professional Responsibility’s Ethical Considerations—A Preventative Law Analysis, 10 VAL. U. L.
REV. 453, 465 (1976)). He notes that ―[w]hile stellar advocates are lionized by the profession and
the public, the best counselors work in obscurity.‖ Id.; see also Porter, supra note 12, at 1158
(arguing that the ―paradigm of retributive justice . . . fuels an adversarial system which encourages
the zealous, win-at-all-costs advocacy‖).
150. The metaphor of lawyer as gladiator can be seen daily on television (e.g., Boston Legal
(ABC television broadcast); Shark (CBS television broadcast)) and in the movies (e.g., THE DEVIL‘S
ADVOCATE (Warner Bros. Pictures 1997), RUNAWAY JURY (Regency Enters. 2003), MICHAEL
CLAYTON (Samuels Media 2007)).
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lawyers as depraved gladiators with no interest in healing conflict. One such
professed advertisement on YouTube is a sad testament to the depraved hiredgun narrative. Accompanied by pictures of a raging fire and general mayhem,
a person who portrays himself as a lawyer named ―The Hammer‖ screams: ―I
cannot rip out the hearts of those who hurt you; I cannot hand you their
severed heads. But I can hunt them down and settle the score. I‘ll squeeze
them for every dime I can—[with voice escalating] every . . .
single . . . dime.‖151
Against this backdrop, many clients undoubtedly walk into a lawyer‘s
office with the expectation that their lawyer will be a gladiator ready to ―fight
the battle for them.‖152 However, the lawyer can reframe any such preexisting expectations by expressly discussing the client‘s expectations and, if
necessary, introducing to the client a somewhat different role for the legal
representation. Such a discussion might easily take place toward the
beginning of the client meeting, when the lawyer provides the client with an
overview of the meeting and advises the client of what to expect from the
meeting. Or, the topic might arise when it first becomes clear from the
client‘s stated objectives or litigation demands that the client‘s judgment is
clouded by emotional pain and reactivity.
The lawyer might normalize any pre-existing client expectations by
expressly bringing up the popular media portrayal of lawyers as hired guns or
gladiators ready to engage in battle. 153 For example, the lawyer might state
something like: ―You know, many people walk into a lawyer‘s office
expecting to see a lawyer like the ones we see on television—like Denny
Crane in Boston Legal or Sebastian Stark on Shark.‖ The lawyer might then
acknowledge the surface appeal, at least, of hiring a lawyer like the attorneys
portrayed in the media, while also sharing how clients often end up frustrated
and unhappy with that kind of representation. For example, the lawyer might
explain:
Despite the media portrayal of lawyers as angry,
avenging gladiators, such a role is less common than most
clients think. Now I know that a lot of people think that it
151. YouTube.com,
Jim
―The
Hammer‖
Shapiro,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hFZigCwRhI8&NR=1 (last viewed Mar. 21, 2009). Although
many of the YouTube ads, such as this one, are mere spoofs of the legal profession, they contribute
to the public perception of lawyers as morally corrupt hired guns. For exa mple, the series of socalled ads by Jimmy ―The Hammer‖ Shapiro have alone registered close to 28,000 hits as of March
21, 2009. Id.
152. See Schneider & Mills, supra note 4, at 618.
153. See Williams, supra note 123, at 18–19 (arguing that, although we ―understand and
interpret the world largely by means of metaphors . . . we are strangely unaware of their importance
and power‖).
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would be great to have a guy like Sebastian Stark fighting the
battle for them. But in real life, lawyers like the ones we see
on TV and in the movies often end up costing their clients
money—that kind of ―litigation-as-war‖ mentality usually
ratchets up the attacks and counterattacks, with the clients
becoming even angrier and more frustrated as the litigation
escalates into all-out war. And the end result is not only that
the lawsuit ends up costing both parties a lot of money in
legal fees, but also that clients often end up pretty unhappy
with the whole legal process, even if they end up getting
much of what they wanted in terms of a financial outcome.
Far from getting the justice they wanted and believe they
deserve, they end up feeling that the legal system let them
down.154
The lawyer should then move quickly to allay any potential concerns the
client might have that, as a different breed of lawyer, she will not be a strong
advocate for the client. At the same time, the lawyer can begin laying a
foundation for a different vision of the lawyer‘s role by alluding to the more
intangible and less obvious quality-of-life issues that will almost certainly
have an impact on the client. For example, the lawyer might state:
As your lawyer, I want you to know that I will work hard
to zealously protect your financial interests and the other
tangible goals you have set for yourself. At the same time, if
you achieve those goals only at the cost of your quality of
life, your health, and your peace of mind, and only at great
legal expense, and you leave the litigation process angrier and
more frustrated than you were when you asked me to
represent you, then I don‘t think that either of us would feel
that I truly served your interests. The ―litigation-as-war‖
mentality might or might not get you what you want in terms
of a financial outcome, but it almost certainly will not leave
you satisfied.
The lawyer might then begin to broaden the client‘s conception of the
purpose of legal representation by including within the list of potential client
goals such intangible objectives as the client‘s quality of life, health, peace of
mind, and personal satisfaction. The lawyer could normalize this broader role
by sharing with the client the wisdom of former Chief Justice Warren Burger:

154. See supra notes 41–80 and accompanying text.
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You know, a former Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court once implored lawyers not to forget that we
―ought to be healers—healers of conflicts,‖155 not courtroom
gladiators. And I take that broader vision of my role
seriously. My view of my role here is really twofold. First, I
will work hard to help you get a satisfactory result in this
litigation; second, I want to collaborate with you during this
process in a way that will hopefully contribute to your
emotional and psychological well-being, not to mention your
health. My hope and my desire is that you emerge at the end
of this process with a sense of inner peace and a belief that
the process was fair and just.
In interactions with the client, the lawyer must also be careful to use
rhetoric and metaphors that are consistent with the role she wishes to assume
in the litigation. This may mean that the lawyer might have to consciously
redirect the client‘s rhetoric into language that is more in alignment with the
goal of helping the client attain his quality-of-life objectives. It is natural for
clients, who see themselves as victimized by another, to use adversarial winlose rhetoric when discussing the conflict.156 However, beneath the surface of
a client‘s angry rhetoric is simply a person whose thinking and vision is
distorted by emotional pain. A client who is caught within the snare of anger
or despair is not best served by having his angry, reactive rhetoric met in kind.
Instead, the client is in need of a mentor who can be a visionary for the
client.157 This is an important part of the lawyer‘s gift—to be a safe vessel for
the client‘s pain and to see what the client cannot yet see—a hopeful vision
for the future.158
Therefore, the lawyer should refrain from discussing the legal process in
terms of a ―battle‖ between ―us‖ and ―them‖ or a battle that will result in a
―winner‖ and a ―loser.‖ Instead of the metaphors of ―war‖ and ―battles,‖ the
lawyer might reframe the litigation process as ―an opportunity for you to put
this behind you and to move on with your life.‖ Instead of responding in kind
to angry denunciations about the other party, the lawyer might instead reframe

155. See Burger, supra note 111, at 66.
156. COREY, supra note 54, at 311.
157. See Calkins, supra note 111, at 303 (―One of the secrets to successful mediation is to
remain positive, even in the darkest moments. From the opening statement to ultimate resolution, the
mediator should constantly affirm that settlement is not only feasible, but will happen.‖).
158. See Morton Deutsch, Internal and External Conflict, in THE NEGOTIATOR‘S FIELDBOOK
231, 236 (Andrea K. Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006). Deutsch notes that
―conflicting parties must have some hope that a mutually acceptable agreement can be found. This
hope may rest upon their own perception of the outlines of a possible fair settlement or it may be
based on their confidence in the expertise of third parties, or even on a generalized optimism.‖ Id.
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the client‘s narrative by helping the client identify with a more hopeful future.
(E.g., ―It sounds like this is taking its toll on you. [Pause] When this
litigation is behind you, I‘m imagining that you‘re going to feel such relief.‖)
The lawyer might also remind the client of the intangible quality-of-life
objectives that are likely important to the client by making liberal use of such
terms as ―fairness,‖ ―hope,‖ and ―your well-being.‖
This new paradigm of the lawyer as a facilitator for healing is not as farfetched or naïve as some lawyers might believe. Indeed, there is already a
quiet revolution within this country that recognizes the lawyer‘s potential to
facilitate healing. 159 Numerous disciplines within the ―comprehensive law
movement‖ recognize that the client is more than the sum-total of a legal
problem, but a human being with psychological, emotional, and even spiritual
needs that can either be harmed or helped through the use of the legal
process.160 These disciplines encourage lawyers to consider the impact of the
legal process on these ―extra-legal‖ concerns. To the extent a legal result can
be achieved while also optimizing the extra-legal concerns, the
comprehensive law movement advocates that lawyers work with clients in a
way that enhances their psychological and emotional well-being.161 In fact, it
is this tantalizing prospect of navigating through the legal system with one‘s
dignity and humanity intact that increasingly draws many clients in the family
law field to collaborative law.162
159. See, e.g., Maldonado, supra note 13, at 478. Changing our own cultural narrative about
the purpose of legal representation will not occur overnight. However, the emergence of the
comprehensive law movement and the spiritual hunger within the population in general are signs that
our legal world is already within the midst of a paradigm shift. If enough lawyers begin to entertain
such dialogues and begin to reframe their relationships with clients in this manner, a critical mass of
the population will begin to reframe the way in which they view legal representation. See, e.g.,
Symposium, supra note 8, at 634 (Rhodes notes that, although she is reluctant to overstate the role of
moral musings in a law school classroom, entertaining such dialogues is key to changing the course
of lawyers‘ behavior.).
160. See, e.g., Daicoff, supra note 39, at 1–4 (for an interesting and thorough discussion of the
shared characteristics of the various movements defined as the comprehensive law movement). The
comprehensive law movement has cut a broad swath through the disciplines, including therapeutic
jurisprudence, preventive law, restorative justice, transformative mediation, facilitative mediation,
holistic law, and collaborative law. Id.; see ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE
PROMISE OF MEDIATION : THE TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT 79 (rev. ed. 2005);
SHEILA M. GUTTERMAN, COLLABORATIVE LAW: A NEW MODEL FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 13–17
(2004); Tesler, supra note 99, at 199–200; David B. Wexler, Lowering the Volume Through Legal
Doctrine: A Promising Path for Therapeutic Jurisprudence Scholarship, 3 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 123,
123 (2002); see also International Alliance of Holistic Lawyers Home Page, http://www.iahl.org/
(last visited Mar. 21, 2009) (promoting lawyers as ―healers, helpers, counselors, problem-solvers,
and peacemakers‖).
161. Daicoff, supra note 39, at 4–5, 7.
162. See, e.g., Gay G. Cox & Robert J. Matlock, The Case for Collaborative Law, 11 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 45, 49 (2004). Cox concludes from survey results that collaborative law meets
the clients‘ goal of participating in a peaceful process. Id. In fact, ―[w]hen asked the open-ended
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2. Building Rapport and Trust
a. The Importance of the Lawyer-Client Relationship
Before collaborating with the client to help the client release some of the
strong negative emotions that are impairing the clarity of the client‘s thinking,
it is essential that the lawyer form a collaborative working alliance with the
client that is characterized by mutual respect and trust.163 Because the work
described in this Article is challenging and, ultimately, humbling, without
trust no client would otherwise expose himself to the rigorous self-inquiry and
transparency that is required of such work. 164 Scholars in the field of
psychotherapy describe the nature of the collaborative working alliance
between client and therapist as the single ―most important variable‖ in
predicting the success of treatment. 165 In fact, the most common feature of
effective psychotherapists, irrespective of the theoretical approach used, is the
ability to establish a strong collaborative working alliance early in the
relationship. 166
Throughout the collaborative dialogue, the lawyer must respect the
client‘s humanity, honor the challenges facing the client, and recognize that,
ultimately, only the client can walk down this path. At the same time, as
question of what they liked best about the collaborative law process, forty percent of those
responding volunteered some variation on the theme of the divorce being amicable.‖ Id.; see also
Gary L. Voegele et al., Collaborative Law: A Useful Tool for the Family Law Practitioner to
Promote Better Outcomes, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 971, 973 (2007). Indeed, based on the
success of collaborative lawyering in family law, lawyers are beginning to engage in collaborative
lawyering in medical malpractice cases. See generally Kathleen Clark, The Use of Collaborative
Law in Medical Error Situations, 19 HEALTH LAW., June 2007, at 19.
163. EDWARD TEYBER, INTERPERSONAL PROCESS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY: A RELATIONAL
APPROACH 32 (4th ed. 2000). The ―collaborative relationship or working alliance‖ might best be
defined as one in which the client perceives the lawyer ―as a capable and trustworthy ally‖ who will
collaborate with the client to help the client find a satisfying and empowering solution. Id.; see also
Robin Wellford Slocum, The Law School Student-Faculty Conference: Towards a Transformative
Learning Experience, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 255, 297–99 (2004) (adopting such a model to describe the
ideal student-teacher relationship in law school).
164. See COZOLINO, supra note 29, at 27. Cozolino contends that ―a safe and trusting
relationship‖ is important to neural growth and integration, which is essential to healing. Id.
165. See Edward Teyber & Faith McClure, Therapist Variables, in HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL CHANGE: PSYCHOTHERAPY PROCESSES & PRACTICES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY ,
supra note 128, at 62, 70; see also Charles J. Gelso & Jean A. Carter, Components of the
Psychotherapy Relationship: Their Interaction and Unfolding During Treatment, 41 J. COUNSELING
PSYCHOL. 296, 296 (1994).
Although I am not suggesting that lawyers assume the role of a therapist or engage in
psychotherapy, the rigor and vulnerability required of this process make the lawyer-client
relationship itself critical to the success of such work.
166. TEYBER, supra note 163, at 33, 35; see also Winick, supra note 34, at 117 (noting the
importance of the lawyer‘s listening abilities ―at the early stages of the professional relationship‖ so
that the lawyer understands the client‘s interests and values).
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Albert Einstein once remarked, ―No problem can be solved from the level of
consciousness that created it.‖167 Therefore, like a wise ally, the lawyer must
be willing to challenge the client‘s biased perceptions and take a leading role
in helping the client see the world from a new perspective. 168 However,
because the self-exploratory process requires the client‘s active and willing
participation, the lawyer cannot force the process or substitute the lawyer‘s
will for the client‘s will. The nature of the working alliance requires true
collaboration between lawyer and client.
b. The Importance of Listening
Listening is perhaps even more important with an emotionally distraught
client than with the typical client, although, of course, active listening skills
are important in all client communications. 169 The angry, emotionally reactive
client will often need to vent some of the angry emotions that are causing him
distress before he can even begin to entertain a dialogue about letting go of
some of the anger that has been causing him pain. 170 In fact, efforts to ignore
a client‘s distress, or to talk a client out of a feeling of distress, would only
deepen the client‘s sense of despair and isolation. 171 Similarly, premature
efforts to evaluate and critique the client‘s perspective, however angry and

167. EinsteinQuotes.com,
Einstein‘s
Quotes
about
Thinking
and
Knowledge,
http://www.einstein-quotes.com/content/view/23/37/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
168. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 133 (1993). Kronman argues that ―a significant portion of the problems with which
lawyers deal‖ require the lawyer to deliberate with the client ―about the wisdom of their clients‘ ends,
as opposed simply to supplying them with the legal means for realizing their desires.‖ Id. He argues
that the lawyer ―must work particularly hard to sustain an attitude of detachment when deliberating
on the client‘s behalf, since this is just what an impetuous client cannot do.‖ Id. at 131; see also
Calkins, supra note 111, at 314 (noting that in mediation, a mediator must sometimes ―signal to a
party that the position taken is untenable‖ because to do otherwise would do a disservice to the
client).
169. See Dinerstein et al., supra note 3, at 758–62 (noting the importance of active listening
and providing illustrations of active listening within the context of lawyer-client dialogue). The
importance of active listening skills is emphasized in each of the major textbooks on legal
interviewing and counseling. See, e.g., BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 130, at 19–57; BINDER
ET AL., supra note 10, at 41–63; COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 29–54; HERMAN ET AL., supra
note 130, at 33–34.
170. Indeed, this was an important goal of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South
Africa—to offer victims of brutality an opportunity for healing by sharing their stories. TUTU, supra
note 117, at 107; see also Winick, supra note 34, at 116. Winick notes that ―[p]eople highly value
‗voice,‘ the ability to tell their story, and ‗validation,‘ the feeling that what they have had to say was
taken seriously.‖ Id. Winick contends that, ―[f]or many litigants, these process values are more
important than winning.‖ Id. at 117; see also ALLEN E. IVEY & MARY B. IVEY, INTENTIONAL
INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: FACILITATING CLIENT DEVELOPMENT IN A MULTICULTURAL
SOCIETY 124 (5th ed. 2003).
171. See TEYBER, supra note 163, at 40–46.
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distorted the client‘s perspective might be, would jeopardize the trust that is
essential to the attorney-client relationship.172
Thus, as the client describes his objectives and concerns and ―tells his
story‖ during the initial phases of the client meeting, the lawyer should refrain
from identifying the flaws or disadvantages of the client‘s professed
objectives or concerns.173 Instead, the lawyer should simply be a good
listener, listening with compassion and curiosity. 174 From the perspective of
―[h]elp me understand,‖175 the lawyer who listens with compassion and
nonjudgment can help the client shift into an emotional and cognitive state
more conducive to ultimately releasing such negative emotions.176
Importantly, the lawyer is not being asked to assume a therapeutic role or
to devote an entire meeting to the client‘s feelings. Indeed, that would be
counterproductive. However, providing a safe harbor for a client to express
the angst and heartache that informs the client‘s objectives and concerns is
essential to forming a collaborative working alliance.

172. See, e.g., Calkins, supra note 111, at 314–15 (cautioning that premature problem spotting
too early in a mediation can be perceived as threatening).
173. In the client-centered and collaborative models of lawyering, the client interview proceeds
in stages, with the client first providing the lawyer with an overview of his objectives and concerns
and then proceeding into a more detailed timeline of the relevant events. See BINDER ET AL., supra
note 10, at 112; COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 59. During these phases of the meeting, it would
be counterproductive for the lawyer to begin critiquing the client‘s goals. See also Winick, supra
note 34, at 117. Winick contends:
Clients have a human need to tell their stories and to feel listened to by their
lawyers in a way that is non-judgmental and empathic. The lawyer needs to
convey sympathy and understanding. The lawyer needs to encourage the client
to ―open up,‖ to communicate what has occurred and the feelings it produced.
Id.
174. See HANH, supra note 42, at 3–5. Hanh points out that ―the practice of compassionate
listening‖ is essential to understanding and transforming anger. Id. at 3. He describes
―compassionate listening‖ as listening that does not involve judgment or blame. Id. at 4. ―You listen
just because you want the other person to suffer less.‖ Id. at 4–5.
175. STONE ET AL., supra note 61, at 167.
176. See, e.g., Calkins, supra note 111, at 280. Calkins notes that, in mediations, ―[w]hen the
parties have released their emotions, there is a decided change in their demeanor, and the mediation
can become quite productive. Many people just want to be heard by someone.‖ Id.
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C. The Steps to Releasing Anger
1. Identifying the Client‘s Ultimate Objective: Vision Statement
a. Vision “In This Moment”
Although it is essential that the client have the opportunity to tell his
―story,‖ it is also important that the lawyer know when to shift into a dialogue
that will facilitate some reduction in the level of the client‘s anger and
resentment. Allowing a client to wallow in his own anger, without shifting
into another perspective, only reinforces and deepens the client‘s narrative of
victimization.177 Thus, after providing appropriate reflection statements 178
and other encouragers,179 the lawyer can begin to shift the dialogue by asking
the client to envision what he would like to have in his life ―in this moment.‖
The lawyer might ask:
I want to shift, for a moment, into thinking about some of
the more intangible objectives you might have in this
litigation that concern your quality of life. And I think it
might be helpful to begin with the here and now, and we can
work forward from there. So, assuming everything was right
with the world, how do you imagine you would feel right
now, in this moment?
The client might respond that he would like the dispute to magically
disappear, or that he wishes the lawsuit had already been resolved with a
favorable financial outcome. The client might also candidly respond that he
would like to see the other party suffer. However, these examples represent
only the surface conditions of what the client really wants—they do not
convey the underlying quality of life they represent to the client. Therefore,
the lawyer might continue asking the client probing questions until the client

177. See LUSKIN, supra note 21, at 79; WALSH, supra note 39, at 80; McCullough et al., supra
note 52, at 490, 502.
178. In a reflection statement, the lawyer takes a sentence stem from the client‘s statement and
attaches a feeling label to it that captures the underlying meaning. See IVEY & IVEY, supra note 170,
at 149. Reflection statements are an important means of conveying empathy. See, e.g., id. at 148–
52.
179. Research in critical discourse analysis suggests that listeners subtly give speakers
permission to continue speaking by using verbal and nonverbal reinforcers that signal their continued
interest in listening. See Jenkins & Parra, supra note 56, at 93. Common reinforcers include such
verbal prompts as ―uh huh,‖ ―OK,‖ or ―ummm,‖ and such nonverbal reinforcers as the head nod,
which serves as the equivalent of a verbal prompt. Id.; see also PETER A. ANDERSEN, NONVERBAL
COMMUNICATION: FORMS AND FUNCTIONS 199, 201 (1999); IVEY & IVEY, supra note 170, at 139.
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voices the attributes of a quality of life he wishes to experience in the present
moment.
As an example, assume the client responds to the question by candidly
admitting that what would make him happy would be to see his wife
suffering. After acknowledging the client‘s honesty, 180 the lawyer would need
to re-educate the client about the likely effect of striking out in revenge, while
also redirecting the client‘s attention to an internal feeling rather than an
external condition. Thus, the lawyer might respond:
I bet that might feel pretty good after what she‘s done.
But you know, my experience from working with other
clients is that seeing the other person suffer feels good only
for a brief moment in time, and then they‘re right back where
they started, suffering the same pain that you‘re experiencing
right now—because inevitably she‘ll strike back and try to
hurt you in turn, and then you‘ll want to strike back again in
retaliation, and it becomes a vicious cycle with the pain just
escalating with each go-round. What I‘m really getting at
here with my question is not what you would like to see
happen to Rebecca—although your feelings about Rebecca
are important and we can get to them later—but the
underlying quality of life they represent to you. So let‘s
assume that you got your wish, and that Rebecca was
suffering right now, in this moment. How do you imagine
you would feel?
If the client is unable to respond to these open questions, the lawyer might
ask more leading questions to help the client begin to imagine a quality-of-life
objective. Thus, the lawyer might ask such questions as: ―Would it mean that
you would be content? Happy? At peace?‖ Ultimately, the client should be
able to identify some qualities of life that resonate with him.
b. Vision of an Ideal Outcome
The client‘s response to the preceding question sets the foundation for the
lawyer to ask the client to envision an ideal quality-of-life outcome to the
litigation. When swept up in bitterness and anger, some clients are likely to
think too small and may not even be able to imagine an outcome in which

180. By acknowledging the client‘s feelings, the lawyer relays empathy, which is essential to
establishing trust. BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 130, at 116–17; HERMAN ET AL., supra note
130, at 32–33; Teyber & McClure, supra note 165, at 70–71. It is important that the client
experience the feeling of ―being heard‖ before offering criticism; otherwise, the client could become
defensive, with a resulting lack of trust that the lawyer is indeed the client‘s ―ally.‖
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they emerge feeling satisfied and at peace. Therefore, as with the previous
question, the lawyer may need to continue asking probing questions until the
client voices the attributes of a quality-of-life objective he wishes to attain by
the termination of the legal process.
2. Exploring the Hidden Costs of Resentment
The client‘s vision statements set the stage for the lawyer to help the client
consider those litigation strategies that would best promote the client‘s
ultimate quality-of-life objectives. The client is now ready to consider
whether his perspective might be clearer if he could release some of the anger
that is obscuring the clarity that both the client and the lawyer need to
evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of various litigation strategies and
options.
The lawyer might first proceed by informing the client that she has some
concern that the client‘s anger and reactivity would impede their ability to
collaborate on an effective litigation strategy. The lawyer might then express
her concern that the client‘s anger and frustration would also thwart the client
from achieving the quality-of-life objectives the client has identified. 181 The
lawyer might also speak of her concern for the client‘s well-being by referring
to the studies from science and medicine that reveal the health costs of
holding onto anger.182
The following dialogue illustrates one way in which a lawyer might use
the client‘s vision statements to persuade the client to consider the possibility
of letting go of some of his anger:
Lawyer: Let‘s fast-forward to the end of this litigation.
Setting aside for the moment the financial issues, what would
be an ideal outcome for you?
Client: I‘d like to be happy. I want my kids to be happy. I
want to be able to see my kids regularly and to be a part of
important events in their lives.
Lawyer: Those are all important objectives. So as we look at
your objectives, here‘s my concern for you. Litigation is
stressful; probably ninety-nine percent of the clients who
walk into my office are under some form of stress. In fact,
just by walking into my office clients take on an extra dose of
181. See Enright & Kittle, supra note 115, at 1625 (observing that when a person recognizes
that he is suffering emotionally by holding onto anger, that recognition ―can serve as a motivator to
change and to think about and try forgiveness‖).
182. See supra notes 69–80 and accompanying text.
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frustration and stress. [Smiling] But frustration and stress, if
they‘re allowed to build during the litigation process, are like
a cancer that eats you up inside. It prevents clients from
getting what they really want—to be happy, and to have some
sense of satisfaction that the process was fair and reasonable.
The bottom line, Bob, is that it‘s been my experience that
the frustration you‘re experiencing toward Rebecca is a big
obstacle to getting what you want—both in terms of being
happy and also in terms of your kids coming out of this
reasonably happy. And the frustration you‘re feeling may
also keep you from getting the financial package you want.
As we talked about a minute ago, once both parties unleash
their anger during the litigation process, it grows. Each time
you try to hurt Rebecca, she‘s likely to try to hurt you back.
It‘s a vicious cycle, Bob. And left unchecked, emotions such
as anger and frustration can build and grow, so that by the
end of the process, you‘re likely to feel angry, frustrated, and
unhappy, irrespective of the financial package you ultimately
end up with. And if that‘s not bad enough, there are lots of
medical studies out there suggesting not only that anger and
stress deplete us, but also that if we hold onto it, it exacts a
physical toll, and can even kill us.183
It is possible the client might react by arguing that he has to be
―aggressive‖ in his litigation strategy to protect his interests from the
unscrupulous and unethical other party. The lawyer might respond to the
client by affirming the legitimacy of the client‘s concern and acknowledging
that this is a concern that the lawyer and client will address. At the same time,
the lawyer might discuss the impact of anger and resentment on the brain‘s
ability to engage in creative problem-solving. 184 Explaining the scientific
basis for how anger causes biochemical changes in the brain can help the
lawyer de-personalize the potentially unwelcome message while also
educating the client.185 Thus, the lawyer might respond to such a client as
follows:
Bob, you‘re right to be concerned that we have to be
careful here. The last thing either one of us would want
would be for you to get taken to the cleaners. [Legitimizing
the client’s concern] At the same time, there‘s another piece
about anger that we should consider. Anger and frustration
183. See supra notes 44–80 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 28–37 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 28–37 and accompanying text.
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not only don‘t feel good over the long haul but they actually
interfere with the decision-making process. 186
Our higher-level reasoning capabilities take place in the
prefrontal cortex, the most highly evolved section of our
brain.187 The middle section of our brain, called the limbic
region, is the gatekeeper between the cerebral cortex and our
brain stem, which is the most primitive part of the brain. 188
The brain stem is sometimes called the ―reptilian‖ part of the
brain because it‘s the knee-jerk part of the brain that‘s
responsible for the ―fight or flight‖ response when we see
danger.189 What happens when we‘re angry is that the limbic
region, acting as gatekeeper, activates the reptilian part of the
brain, placing us in a heightened state of readiness for ―fight
or flight.‖190 Unfortunately, because most of the action‘s
taking place in the brain stem, this limits our ability to access
our cerebral cortex.191
These chemical reactions in the brain actually affect our
ability to evaluate risks and to forecast what other people are
likely to do and respond to what we do.192 By reducing the
level of frustration and anger, we have a better chance of
more accurately evaluating the risks, costs, and benefits of
various litigation strategies and options.
3. Exploring the Benefits of Letting the Anger Go
After discussing the adverse health and psychological costs associated
with resentment and anger, the client should be ready to entertain the
possibility of moving forward in his life without carrying the weight of these
negative emotions. However, many clients might appreciate the idea of
releasing anger as a concept, but have no idea how they might convert the
concept into a reality. The lawyer can assure the client that:
There is no magic to the process, nor is it something that
happens by accident. Instead, this is a skill that can be
learned, assuming you are willing to allow me to guide you

186. See supra notes 28–37 and accompanying text.
187. SIEGEL, THE DEVELOPING MIND, supra note 28, at 10.
188. Id.
189. See COZOLINO, supra note 29, at 25–26.
190. See id.
191. See CAINE & CAINE, supra note 31, at 140 (noting that the ―capacity to perceive and
generate new meanings is reduced‖ when under threat).
192. See id.
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through the process.193 And the first step in the process is the
mere willingness to entertain the possibility of letting the
anger go. 194
The client might react strongly to this prospect, 195 arguing that by
releasing the anger, he would have to acknowledge that the other party is
―right‖ or deserves to be forgiven. The client might angrily proclaim that the
other party is ―evil‖ (or some similar pejorative) and doesn‘t ―deserve‖ to be
forgiven. 196 The semantics of whether one calls this process a ―forgiveness‖
process or, rather, a process of ―letting go of anger‖ is not substantively
important.197 By whatever label, the lawyer will need to educate the client
about what this process actually means. This process does not mean that the
client must condone the other party‘s conduct, forget what happened, or seek
to reconcile with the other party.198 The lawyer might also assure the client
that he doesn‘t need to tell the other party that he has let his anger go, or even

193. LUSKIN, supra note 21, at 65.
194. See Enright & Kittle, supra note 115, at 1626 (distinguishing the commitment to forgive
from the actual process that results in forgiveness).
195. See, e.g., Daicoff, supra note 39, at 23 (citing Steven Keeva, What Clients Want: People
Who Come to Arnie Herz Seeking Legal Help Leave With Some Unexpected Solutions, A.B.A. J.,
June 2001, at 48). Daicoff describes Wall Street lawyer Arnie Herz, whose client began to walk out
of his office, complaining: ―You‘re too nice. I need a tough litigator.‖ Id. at 23.
Taking a big risk, Herz responded, ―I know you think you are so tough and I am
not, but the truth is, in all my years of experience, I think you may be the
weakest person I‘ve worked with. Here you have set out a vision that was to be
free of these people—you didn‘t mention that you wanted to punish them, teach
them a lesson, or spend $100,000 of your own money and five years of your life
doing so. What I see is that you don‘t have the strength to hold on to your own
vision and deal more effectively with your own anger. And I‘ll bet you‘ve been
doing this all your life.‖
Id.
Although the client was at first ―flushed red with anger,‖ he recognized that there was a grain of truth
in what the lawyer said. Id. Together, the lawyer and client agreed on a more collaborative plan of
action that ultimately obtained for the client everything he wanted. Id.
196. LUSKIN, supra note 21, at 105–06. Luskin, the co-founder of the Stanford University
Forgiveness Project, reports that it is this belief that thwarts many people from forgiving their
transgressors. Id.
197. The term ―forgiveness‖ is elusive and means different things to different people.
Moreover, many people react strongly to the idea of forgiveness because of misguided beliefs about
what forgiveness actually means. Therefore, the lawyer is likely to encounter less resistance if she
refers to the process as one of ―letting go of anger‖ or ―releasing anger.‖ These phrases accurately
describe the process and are also less likely to be misconstrued by clients. Nonetheless, the process
described in this Article is consistent with the author‘s definition of forgiveness.
198. LUSKIN, supra note 21, at 68; see also Enright & Kittle, supra note 115, at 1623
(contending that forgiveness does not mean that one condones the transgressor‘s behavior, forgets the
behavior, or reconciles with the transgressor).
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that he forgives the other party, because this process is simply for the benefit
of the client.199
The lawyer might then explain that because this process does not ask the
client to condone the other party‘s behavior, there is no transgression so
terrible that the client cannot let the anger go. Instead, the purpose of this
process is to free the client from the heavy burden of carrying hurt and anger
from a past experience into the future. 200 The lawyer might elaborate on this
idea by explaining:
You know, some people associate anger with power, but
in reality, anger makes us weak. 201 When we‘re angry, we
have actually given our power away to another person—our
happiness is now dependent upon the other person and what
they have done to us, or are not doing for us, rather than on
ourselves. 202 In other words, we‘ve shifted the locus of
control from the internal to the external. And, by holding
onto anger, what we‘re really saying is that we cannot be at
peace, cannot be happy, unless the past can magically be
erased. Because the past can‘t be changed, then anger
condemns us to a future of being a victim to the past, a victim
to the other party. Although anger can make us feel powerful
in the moment, holding onto it over time saps our strength.
Far from making us powerful, anger makes us weak. 203
There is a wonderful parable the lawyer might share with the client that
illustrates the costs of holding onto anger and the freedom that comes from
letting it go. A Taoist sage gave a disciple an empty sack and asked him to
place a potato in the sack for every person for whom he carried resentment. 204
The sage asked the disciple to carry the bag of potatoes around for one week
and then to return.205 As the week progressed, the task of carrying the sack of
potatoes became increasingly burdensome as the potatoes grew heavier and
199. Cf. Susanna Braun, Forgiveness, South Africa’s Truth Commission, and Military Trials:
America’s Options in Dealing with Crimes Against Humanity in Light of the Terrorist Attacks on
September 11, 2001, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & P OL‘Y 493, 495–99 (2002) (contending that
―forgiveness consists of more than making an injured party feel better; it is something that an injured
party offers to another—typically, the wrongdoer‖).
200. LUSKIN, supra note 21, at 63; see also Enright & Kittle, supra note 115, at 1625, 1627
(noting that there is an ―awareness of internal, emotional release‖ that comes from forgiveness).
201. See Maldonado, supra note 13, at 481.
202. See CHILDRE & ROZMAN, supra note 35, at 13.
203. See Maldonado, supra note 13, at 481.
204. Derek Lin, Tao of Forgiveness, http://www.taoism.net/living/2004/200409.htm (last
visited Mar. 21, 2009).
205. Id.
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began to emit a ripe odor.206 When the disciple returned at the end of the
week, the disciple had learned a valuable lesson: the sack of potatoes was just
like the negative feelings he carried with him for each person for whom he
carried resentment. 207 The sage counseled that this ―is exactly what happens
when one holds a grudge‖—the load of carrying that grudge becomes a
burden and, ultimately, festers.208 To lighten the load, one must let the anger
go.209
Thus, it is through the transformative power of releasing anger and
resentment that the client can regain his personal power. As Mahatma Gandhi
recognized, ―Each one has to find his peace from within. And peace to be real
must be unaffected by outside circumstances.‖ 210 Freedom comes from the
client‘s ability to be at peace from within, accepting what is, rather than
demanding that reality be different in order to find peace. 211 Thus, the process
of releasing anger and resentment is not for the other party, but for the client
himself. 212 This understanding, at least for some clients, may actually
represent a paradigm shift of life-changing magnitude. This process does not
simply lighten the heart; it is literally transformative. 213
The lawyer can also educate the client about the health benefits that result
from letting go of anger.214
Studies reflect, almost uniformly, the
physiological benefits of letting go of resentment and anger. 215 For example,
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. In the parable, the term ―forgiveness‖ is used, rather than the phrase ―letting the anger
go.‖ Id. Again, however, the terms as used in this Article are interchangeable.
210. NationMaster.com,
Encyclopedia:
Inner
Peace
Quotes,
http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Inner-peace (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
211. See LUSKIN, supra note 21, at 68–69.
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., TUTU, supra note 117, at 155–57. Bishop Tutu relays a moving story that
illustrates the transcendent nature of forgiveness. Id. One woman lost her seven-year-old daughter
while camping in Montana. Id. at 155. The man who had kidnapped and killed her daughter later
called her, not to apologize, but to ―taunt‖ her. Id. Although the man never apologized, the woman
ultimately released the anger she held against him, recognizing that ―the only way we can be whole,
healthy, happy persons is to learn to forgive.‖ Id. at 155–56. She then spoke to the transformational
nature of true forgiveness: ―Though I would never have chosen it so, the first person to receive a gift
of life from the death of my daughter . . . was me.‖ Id. at 156–57 (emphasis added); see also
Williams, supra note 123, at 48 n.134. Williams refers to the change of heart that results from
helping parties ―heal from the trauma of the underlying conflict‖ as having a ―transcendental aspect;
it has the potential to take people beyond ordinary or common experience; in dealing with the pain of
conflict and conflict resolution, they are approaching a more sacred realm.‖ Id.
214. See Maldonado, supra note 13, at 481.
215. See, e.g., Enright & Kittle, supra note 115, at 1628. In their studies of people in different
settings, Enright and Kittle found, ―[i]n most cases‖ those who experienced forgiveness had reduced
anger and anxiety and an increase in self-esteem and hope. Id. They concluded: ―We have yet to see
even one case in which a person became measurably worse in an emotional sense when freely
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after completing forgiveness training, subjects in several studies reported ―a
significant decrease in the symptoms of stress,‖ such as a racing heart, an
upset stomach, and dizziness.216 Other studies reflect that the release of
resentment can significantly improve healthy functioning in the
cardiovascular and nervous systems. 217 One physician concludes that
releasing anger through forgiveness ―can literally be life-saving.‖218
4. Using Narrative and Metaphor
When discussing the price of anger and resentment, and the freedom that
comes from releasing these emotions, the use of narrative and metaphor can
make the discussion come alive for the client in a way that a detached
commentary cannot.219 Moreover, the use of narrative allows the lawyer to
educate the client while minimizing the risk of defensiveness. For example,
the parable of the disciple carrying the sack of heavy, odorous potatoes makes
vivid the cost of holding onto anger and resentment. 220 The lawyer might
enhance the impact of narrative by asking rhetorical questions that personalize
the theme of the narrative.221 Thus, in response to a client who believes that
his transgressor doesn‘t ―deserve‖ to be forgiven, the lawyer might help the
client shift his perspective by asking: ―[The transgressor] may not deserve to
be forgiven. However, the real question is—do you deserve to let this go?‖
By juxtaposing the client‘s belief that the other party does not deserve to be
forgiven with the question ―do you deserve to let this go?‖ the lawyer
highlights the fallacy underlying the client‘s refusal to let go of the anger and
resentment that is causing him such unhappiness.
The lawyer might also use metaphor to paint a visual picture of how the
client has become a victim to his anger: ―Isn‘t it time for [the other party] to
stop renting space in your head?‖ 222 Metaphor can also appeal to the client‘s

choosing to forgive . . . .‖ Id.
216. LUSKIN, supra note 21, at 79.
217. Id.; McCraty et al., supra note 51, at 1089–93; William A. Tiller et al., Cardiac
Coherence: A New Noninvasive Measure of Autonomic Nervous System Order, 2 ALTERNATIVE
THERAPIES 52, 52–65 (1996); see also WALSH, supra note 39, at 80. Walsh notes that even people
who have had a heart attack and learn to release their anger through forgiveness, relaxation, and open
communication are ―much less likely to suffer a recurrence than people who continue to wallow in
their old aggressive ways.‖ WALSH, supra note 39, at 80.
218. WALSH, supra note 39, at 80.
219. See, e.g., Dinerstein et al., supra note 3, at 799–800. Dinerstein describes the persuasive
appeal of narrative in moral dialogue between a family law lawyer and client. Id.; see also SHAFFER
& COCHRAN, supra note 120, at 132.
220. See supra notes 204–09 and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., Dinerstein et al., supra note 3, at 799 (suggesting the use of metaphor and
rhetorical questions in moral dialogue).
222. See LUSKIN, supra note 21, at 112.
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highest vision of himself, with the lawyer asking the client whether he is
―willing to be the hero in this war.‖
The use of narrative can also illuminate the lessons from neuroscience and
medicine. The metaphor of the brain as a hill of virgin snow, with each
thought deepening a pathway that either invites greater anger or, alternatively,
inner peace, can be a powerful visual image of the choices the client faces and
their consequences.
As other scholars have suggested, the lawyer can also use ―war stories‖
from her own practice to paint a vivid picture of the harm that results when
litigation escalates into war.223 In addition to the emotional, psychological,
and physiological harm that results when litigation is escalated into war, such
war stories would also include stories of the adverse legal and economic
consequences that can result.224 Perhaps most persuasive, however, would be
the lawyer‘s disclosure of how anger, and the ultimate decision to let it go, has
affected her own life. 225
5. A Cognitive Inquiry for the Release of the Anger
a. Psychological Basis for the Cognitive Inquiry
The cognitive inquiry described below in this Article stems from a
premise central to cognitive and rational emotive therapeutic modalities. The
premise is that we are not distressed by what is actually happening to us, but
by our thoughts about what is happening to us 226—a premise recognized by
the Greek philosopher Epictetus 227 and now supported by recent studies in

223. See, e.g., Dinerstein et al., supra note 3, at 800 (describing a dialogue in which the lawyer
uses a ―war story‖ of another client to illustrate the costs of vengeance in litigation). Of course,
within such a dialogue, the lawyer must take care not to inadvertently reveal the identities of other
clients but rather speak in hypotheticals. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 4
(2003) (―A lawyer‘s use of a hypothetical to discuss issues relating to the representation is
permissible so long as there is no reasonable likelihood that the listener will be able to ascertain the
identity of the client or the situation involved.‖).
224. See Dinerstein et al., supra note 3, at 799–800.
225. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 120, at 133. Shaffer and Cochran point out the
importance of the lawyer as a model for the client. Id. They argue, for example, that ―[i]t will
probably be difficult for a lawyer to invite a client to follow an ethic that involves sacrifice unless the
lawyer is a person who makes sacrifices.‖ Id.
226. COREY, supra note 54, at 309–13. The idea that a client‘s thoughts about reality are the
source of suffering is also one of the central premises of Adlerian psychologists. Id. at 113–14; see
also DANIEL GOLEMAN, DESTRUCTIVE EMOTIONS: HOW CAN WE OVERCOME THEM ? 337 (2003).
Goleman reports ―amazingly little connection‖ between the circumstances in one‘s life and one‘s
happiness. Id. For example, in one study, researchers found ―negligible differences in satisfaction
with life between paraplegics, ordinary people, and lottery winners.‖ Id.; see also KATIE, supra note
137, at 4 (―It is not our thoughts, but the attachment to our thoughts, that causes suffering.‖).
227. KATIE, supra note 137, at x, 257 (citing EPICTETUS, ENCHEIRIDION, V).
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neuroscience. 228 This phenomenon explains why no two people experience
the same event in quite the same way. 229 In the case of an angry client who is
in the midst of a divorce, it is not the divorce itself that causes the client‘s
anger but the client‘s beliefs about the divorce. 230 For example, the client
might believe that the divorce means that he has been rejected as unworthy or
unlovable. 231 In contrast, another client might believe that a divorce means
freedom. The lawyer might introduce this concept to a client through the
vehicle of narrative:
You know, there is a relationship between our thoughts
and emotions. 232 Most people believe that it‘s what happens
to us that makes us happy or unhappy. But in fact, that‘s not
actually true. The most important driving force behind our
emotions is not what happens to us, but our thoughts about
what happens to us.233
To illustrate, let‘s say that I‘m on the off-ramp of a
freeway waiting in a long line of cars to exit the freeway. All
of a sudden—BAM—someone hits me from behind! I get
out of my car, angry, thinking: ―What an idiot. That guy‘s a
complete imbecile!‖ Just as I‘m about to yell at the idiot who
hit my car, I notice that someone crashed into his car, which
caused him to hit me. Where did my anger go? My anger
moved to the driver in the next car. But as I approach the
next car, I notice that the driver is slumped over the steering
wheel, having suffered what appears to be a heart attack.
Where did my anger go? My anger seemed to disappear, as it
quickly turned to concern for the driver and questions about
whether it‘s possible to save her life.
Notice that this is the same incident, but the different
thoughts I have about the incident create different emotions.
The story illustrates that it wasn‘t the incident itself that made
228. See, e.g., BEGLEY, supra note 44, at 9–10.
229. See COREY, supra note 54, at 309–13. I am reminded of an airplane flight I took a
number of years ago, when the plane began to land at Lambert International Field in St. Louis at the
same time as two different tornadoes touched down at Lambert Field. The plane began bucking
dramatically and then dropped like a bomb through the air before the pilot could regain control of the
plane and fly to another city for landing. As I struggled not to decompose on the plane while
contemplating the terrifying likelihood that I would die on the plane that day, I heard a small child‘s
voice from the back of the plane gleefully exclaiming: ―roller coaster, roller coaster!‖
230. Id. at 300.
231. See, e.g., Deutsch, supra note 158, at 234–35 (observing that, in a bitter divorce
mediation, the couple might become entrapped in an escalating vicious power struggle in which each
spouse feels that ―his or her self-esteem or core identity [is] at stake‖).
232. See COREY, supra note 54, at 300.
233. See id.
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me angry, but my thoughts about it that made me angry. It‘s
me making myself angry. While I can‘t control what other
people do or don‘t do, or whether someone hits my car, the
good news is that this is the one thing I actually can control—
I have total control over how I choose to react to what
happened.
Cognitive and rational emotive therapists believe that the most effective
way to help relieve a client‘s distress is to engage in a cognitive inquiry, with
the client identifying the underlying thoughts that are causing the distress,
testing the veracity of the thoughts against reality and then replacing the
distressing thoughts with healthier ones. 234 Again, this cognitive inquiry is
supported by neuroscience—by training the mind to replace angry thoughts
with understanding and compassion, the client develops and strengthens
neuropathways in the brain that literally change the hardwiring of his brain. 235
Practiced more consistently, the healthier thoughts ultimately translate into a
temperament of greater peace and satisfaction. 236
b. Setting the Stage for the Cognitive Inquiry
Before moving into the inquiry that is designed to help the client reduce
the level of anger and frustration he is experiencing, the lawyer will obviously
need to ensure that the client is willing to proceed further. The lawyer might
begin the discussion by reaffirming that the goal of the dialogue is to benefit
the client and not necessarily the other party, and by giving the client a sense
of hope that it is possible to alleviate some of the anger and frustration the
client is bringing into the litigation process. 237 As an example, the lawyer
might state:
234. COREY, supra note 54, at 311–12. Rational emotive therapists contend that replacing
unhealthy thoughts with healthy ones leads to a corresponding new set of feelings, as the former
thoughts no longer hold power over the client. Id. at 301.
235. See, e.g., COZOLINO, supra note 29, at 159–62.
236. GOLEMAN, supra note 226, at 285. Goleman suggests that by focusing our thoughts on
compassion we strengthen the neural pathways of the brain associated with compassion and,
ultimately, ―the actual feeling of compassion comes naturally and spontaneously, arising easily.‖ Id.
at 286. As an analogy, Goleman compares the discipline of training our thoughts to a technique
developed by sports coaches who train skiers. Id. at 285. During the summer months, the coaches
ask the skiers to lie in bed and imagine skiing down the slopes. Id. After mentally envisioning their
progress down the ski slopes, the students were ―much better‖ skiers simply as a result of the mental
practice of focusing their thoughts on skiing. Id. Focusing like this also improves the skill of
developing compassion, gratitude, and any other emotion one might wish to develop and strengthen.
237. See Deutsch, supra note 158, at 234–35 (recognizing that in a bitter divorce mediation, the
first step is to help each spouse recognize that ―the present situation of a bitter, stalemated conflict no
longer served his or her real interests‖). Because the client must believe that it is not in his selfinterest to continue feeding his anger, it is helpful to begin the dialogue with a reminder of the carrot
(inner peace and fulfillment of a vision) and a stick (carrying the burden of anger). See id.
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There‘s an exercise I‘ve done with a number of my
clients that has been of benefit to many of them. This process
can be an antidote, or a balm, that can help ratchet down your
frustration level. Working with this process is like going to
the gym; the initial part may be awkward and bumpy, but it‘s
like lifting weights to build muscle. [Using metaphor] This
exercise can help build up your power in the world. Right
now, Rebecca is a power leak—she‘s renting space in your
head. The goal is to get to the point where she doesn‘t push
your buttons so much, so that you and I can access all of your
options and decide on a strategy that will optimize our
chances of successfully getting you what you want in this
litigation.
Again, while I can‘t guarantee the outcome, I can
guarantee that if you gain some level of self-mastery with this
process, you will experience less frustration and have a
greater sense of well-being and satisfaction with this process
regardless of the specifics of the outcome. Are you willing to
try a short process that might be of benefit to you?
c. Identifying the Source of the Client’s Anger
The lawyer should then ask the client to relay, in a sentence or two, what
it is that most angers or frustrates the client about the other party, and what it
is that the other party should not be doing or thinking. 238 The client should
actually memorialize the sentences in writing rather than simply verbalizing
the source of his frustration. 239 Reducing the source of anger to writing is
important for several reasons. First, a verbal dialogue alone tempts the client
to engage in a prolonged rant about the other party rather than succinctly
describing the source of the client‘s anger. Second, without the clarity of the
written word, the egoic mind will tend to move in circles during the
discussion in an effort to obscure clarity and validate why the original laundry
list of wrongs was justified. 240
After the client writes down why he is angry and frustrated at the other
party, the client should read the list aloud to the lawyer. Note that the client
might have expressed anger about personal attributes of the other party (e.g.,
―She is selfish and abusive‖), about what the other party should or should not

238. See, e.g., KATIE, supra note 137, at 17 (identifying a more detailed set of questions
designed to help identify the source of one‘s anger); see also COREY, supra note 54, at 301.
239. See KATIE, supra note 137, at 17. Alternatively, the lawyer could transcribe the client‘s
language, being careful to use the client‘s exact words.
240. Id. at 11.
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be doing (e.g., ―She should treat me with respect,‖ or ―She shouldn‘t be so
selfish‖), or both. Both kinds of angry thoughts are appropriate sources for
inquiry.
However, if the client identifies a specific act that angers him (e.g., ―My
wife had an affair‖), the lawyer should encourage the client to delve deeper to
discover the underlying belief that is causing the client pain. 241 Thus, the
lawyer might add the additional phrase ―and it means that . . .‖ to flesh out the
underlying belief that is causing the pain. 242 For example, the lawyer might
ask the client: ―You are angry at your wife because she had an affair, and it
means that . . . [Pausing to allow the client to complete the statement].‖ The
client might respond by recognizing that ―it means that she doesn‘t love me‖
or ―doesn‘t respect me.‖ Although the fact that the client‘s wife had an affair
would not be an appropriate topic for inquiry, the client‘s belief that his wife
doesn‘t love or respect him would be an appropriate topic.
i.

Allaying Potential Concerns

Before proceeding any further, the lawyer may wish to allay any potential
concerns that the client might be manipulated or pushed into conceding that
the other party‘s conduct or actions were somehow ―okay.‖ Such a concern
would obviously impede the ability of the lawyer and client to work
effectively through the process. The lawyer can reassure the client that she is
not suggesting the client doesn‘t have the right to be angry about what
happened. Nor does the process require that the client condone the original
conduct itself. Rather, the inquiry asks the client only to investigate the
thoughts he has been perpetuating about the other party‘s conduct that are
exacerbating the original source of pain. In other words, it is not what
happens to us that shapes our lives, but what we do about what happens to us
that shapes our lives.
To help illustrate the distinction, the lawyer might use the metaphor of a
black box. 243 The lawyer could ask the client to visually place the other
party‘s behavior in the black box. The lawyer might reassure the client as
follows:
Before we begin the process, I want to emphasize that we
will in no way be condoning the affair that Rebecca had. We

241. It is not the act itself that is causing the client‘s suffering but the client‘s beliefs about the
act. See supra notes 226–36 and accompanying text. Thus, pursuing an inquiry about the act itself
would not be productive.
242. See KATIE, supra note 137, at 69.
243. The lawyer can refer figuratively to a black box or can literally use a small box for this
purpose.
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can even visually put the affair in a black box, and we‘re
going to leave that black box alone, because I will in no way
be suggesting that you don‘t have a right to be angry about
the affair. Instead, we‘re merely going to investigate one of
the thoughts you have about the affair that is frustrating you
to see whether we can help reduce the frustration you have
around that thought—the thought that Rebecca doesn‘t
respect you.
ii. The Importance of Emotional Detachment
It is important that the client attain some degree of emotional detachment
while working through this process. 244 If the lawyer observes the client
becoming angry at any point, the lawyer can help the client regain a more
balanced emotional state by asking the client to take a deep breath and to
visualize himself as an impartial observer on a balcony looking down on
himself. 245 It can help to achieve this ―witness‖ state of awareness by
reminding oneself: ―I can watch this thought come and go without having to
respond to it.‖246 If appropriate, the lawyer can suggest that the client might
find it helpful to close his eyes as he engages in the visualization, so that he
can figuratively ground himself for the inquiry to follow.
If the client has difficulty achieving a more neutral witness state, the
lawyer might suggest that the client think about something for which he is
grateful in his life. Refocusing the mind‘s attention on a topic that produces
feelings of gratitude will help the client move out of anger into a more open
and expansive state.247

244. Should the client become angry at any point during the discussion, biochemical responses
in the brain would impede the client‘s ability to respond to the lawyer‘s questions with an open mind.
See CAINE & CAINE, supra note 31, at 76; SIEGEL & HARTZELL, supra note 28, at 154–56.
245. See WILLIAM URY, GETTING P AST NO: NEGOTIATING IN DIFFICULT SITUATIONS 11 (rev.
ed. 1993) (suggesting this technique during any negotiation that has become stressful). Buddhists,
mystics, and practitioners of mindfulness meditation advocate a similar practice of entering into the
―witness‖ state by cultivating a ―meta-awareness‖ of awareness. ANDREW HARVEY, THE DIRECT
PATH: CREATING A JOURNEY TO THE DIVINE USING THE WORLD ‘S MYSTICAL TRADITIONS 113–14
(2000); SIEGEL, THE MINDFUL BRAIN, supra note 45, at 8–13; VISHNU-DEVANANDA, MEDITATION
AND M ANTRAS 120–21 (2d ed. 1995). Buddhists teach that ―by detaching ourselves from our
thoughts, by observing our thinking dispassionately and with clarity, we have the ability to think
thoughts that allow us to overcome afflictions such as being chronically angry.‖ BEGLEY, supra note
44, at 14; see also Ellinghausen, supra note 52, at 71–72 (describing this mindfulness practice in
Buddhism).
246. BEGLEY, supra note 44, at 146. Begley recounts that a researcher at Cambridge found this
type of self-talk to be successful when treating depressed patients. Id.
247. See LUSKIN, supra note 21, at 111–17; SIEGEL, THE MINDFUL BRAIN, supra note 45, at
32.

2009]

DILEMMA OF THE VENGEFUL CLIENT

535

d. Four Powerful Questions
i.

Question 1: Is It True? Can You Really Know that It‘s True?

After the source of the client‘s anger has been reduced to writing and the
client is in a relatively detached mental state, the lawyer should select one part
of the client‘s statement that appears to be at the heart of the client‘s anger
and use that aspect of the statement as the subject of the dialogue between the
lawyer and client.248 The lawyer should then challenge the reality of that
aspect of the client‘s statement by asking the client: ―Is it true?‖249 The client
is likely to quickly respond: ―Yes, of course it‘s true.‖
If the client does respond affirmatively to the first question, the lawyer
should then ask the client to think more deeply about the veracity of his
thought by asking the client: ―Can you really know that it‘s true?‖250 This
question is designed to help the client begin to break down the perceptual
distortions that have fueled the anger. Blanket statements about the
transgressor‘s personal flaws reflect polarized thinking. 251 For example, no
one is entirely selfless or entirely selfish—we are, each of us, selfish at times
and more selfless at other times. 252 Due to perceptual distortions, however,
the angry client who has labeled his spouse as ―selfish‖ is stuck in polarized
thinking that is fueling the anger.253
Similarly, statements about how the transgressor ―should,‖ ―must,‖
―should not,‖ or ―must not‖ behave are the result of unrealistic expectations
that cause anger and frustration. 254 We all, of course, have preferences about
how we would like to be treated. However, a preference that becomes an
unrealistic demand causes only blame and unhappiness.255 For example, the
thought that ―my spouse should treat me with respect‖ is a good aspiration for
a perfect universe. However, when the aspiration becomes a demand, the
248. For example, the client might have listed ten qualities of his spouse that anger him.
However, to avoid confusion and a potentially circular discussion, it is important to focus on only
one complaint at a time during the inquiry.
249. KATIE, supra note 137, at 15; see also COREY, supra note 54, at 305 (describing how
cognitive therapists help clients dispute irrational beliefs by asking questions designed to help the
client see that the belief isn‘t necessarily true).
250. KATIE, supra note 137, at 15.
251. See COREY, supra note 54, at 311.
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. See id. at 299–300.
255. Id. Blame is at the core of most unhappiness, and results from escalating one‘s ―desires
and preferences into dogmatic ‗shoulds,‘ ‗musts,‘ ‗oughts,‘ demands, and commands.‖ Id. at 299.
These broad, absolutist demands are too unrealistic to lead to happiness. Id. at 313. Thus, in order to
maintain good emotional health, it is necessary to question and, ultimately, relinquish such
unrealistic dogmatic and absolutist demands. Id. at 299–300, 311–12.

536

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[92:481

client has given his power away to his spouse. 256 The client has, in effect,
decided that he can be happy only when his spouse treats him with respect, as
defined by his secret, internal rule book. The locus of the client‘s happiness,
then, is ―out there‖ rather than from within.
The process of deconstructing this type of angry, frustrating thought
involves substituting aspirations, or preferences, for dogmatic, absolutist
demands.257 The lawyer might help the client begin to deconstruct such
thinking by asking the client to consider a two-part litmus test to question his
beliefs: (1) Is the request reasonable?, and (2) Is the request enforceable? 258
This test reflects the reality that dogmatic, absolutist demands are only
sometimes reasonable and are never enforceable. 259 Although it may be
reasonable to prefer that a spouse treat one with respect, it is not possible to
enforce that preference 100% of the time.
With that discussion as a backdrop, consider a client going through a
divorce who complains that his wife should treat him with more respect.
Upon being asked whether he can really know that such a statement is true, a
client with an open mind is likely to concede that because the demand is
unenforceable, he cannot really know for sure that his demand is true. The
client may have a strong preference that his spouse treat him with more
respect, but can the client really know that his spouse should, or must, treat
him with more respect? However, at this point, it is not essential that the
client open his mind to this possibility, and the lawyer should not attempt to
dissuade the client from his point of view. The important point is that the
client has identified a thought that is at the source of his anger and the lawyer
has planted a seed of doubt as to the validity of the thought.
ii. Question 2: How Do You React When You Believe that Thought?
The next question is designed to help the client recognize that the angry
belief does not benefit him in any way—in fact, the belief causes only pain. 260
Thus, the lawyer should next ask the client: ―How do you react when you

256. See id. at 313 (noting that these broad, absolutist demands are too unrealistic to lead to
happiness).
257. See id. at 305. Cognitive therapists teach clients how to deal with such dogmatic demands
by tracking down these ―internalized self-messages‖ and recognizing that they not only do not serve
the client but that they are, in fact, irrational because they do not reflect reality. Id. The client then
substitutes a reality-based preference for the irrational demand. Id.; see also LUSKIN, supra note 21,
at 132.
258. See LUSKIN, supra note 21, at 128–36.
259. See id.
260. Both cognitive therapists and rational emotive therapists use a similar technique to help
clients perceive how their negative thoughts are affecting them. COREY, supra note 54, at 307, 311–
12; see also LUSKIN, supra note 21, at 181.
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believe the thought [that your wife should treat you with more respect]?‖261 It
is important to encourage the client to spend a few moments thinking about
how that belief actually affects his life.
If the client has difficulty articulating how the troubling thought affects
his life, the lawyer might ask several directed questions to help the client
consider how his angry thoughts affect his relationship with other people and
himself. For example, the dialogue might unfold as follows:
Lawyer: As you think this over, consider this: How do you
treat other people when you believe the thought that Rebecca
doesn‘t respect you?262
Client: Well, it makes me angry, so I can be short on patience
with the children. And I guess I‘m no picnic at work either; I
can be a little short-tempered at times. [Laughing selfconsciously] And whenever I think about her when I‘m
driving, sometimes I feel like killing the S.O.B. who cuts me
off in traffic . . . .
Lawyer: Most of us can probably identify with that.
[Chuckling to normalize the client’s response] You‘re doing
well. [Recognition response] So, let‘s take this in a slightly
different direction. When you believe the thought that
Rebecca doesn‘t respect you, how does that affect you
physically? For example, some people get headaches, others
get short of breath, while some get a racing
pulse . . . [Pausing for client to respond].
Client: Okay, let me think for a minute.
Lawyer: Take your time.
Client: Well, maybe all of the above, depending on how
angry I get. I can be pretty prone to headaches, and
sometimes the very thought of her and this whole nightmare
makes me so angry that I literally feel sick to my stomach.
I‘ve probably lost fifteen pounds through this whole mess.

261. KATIE, supra note 137, at 15. For greater clarity, it is helpful for the lawyer to incorporate
the crux of the client‘s angry thought into the question itself. See also COREY, supra note 54, at 307
(describing this practice as ―a form of intense mental practice designed to establish new emotional
patterns‖).
262. See KATIE, supra note 137, at 19.
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Lawyer: It sounds like this has really been eating away at you.
[Pausing to show empathy] Before we move on, though, I
want to ask you one more question about how your thoughts
about Rebecca affect you. You‘ve identified how it affects
your dealings with other people, including your children, and
also how it affects you physically. But how do you treat
yourself with your own thoughts when you believe the
thought that Rebecca doesn‘t respect you? 263
Client: Well, I‘m not really sure what you mean by that . . . .
Lawyer: Well, when I‘m angry about something, sometimes I
second-guess myself, and I might even privately berate
myself.
Client: Yeah, I guess I can relate to that. I keep replaying in
my mind how I could have done things differently with
Rebecca, how I should have stood up to her and not been
such a doormat.
Lawyer: It‘s amazing, isn‘t it, how hurtful we can be to
ourselves. I think sometimes that I hurt myself with my own
thoughts far more than other people hurt me.
Client: I hadn‘t really ever thought about it that way, but
yeah, you may be onto something there.
iii. Question 3: What Would You Be Experiencing Without that Thought?
The next question is designed to help the client recognize that it would
benefit the client to release the angry thought. 264 Thus, the lawyer should
segue into the next question: ―So, we‘ve just established that this thought is
causing you a lot of pain, both physically and emotionally. So, let‘s look at
this from a different angle. Using your imagination for a moment, what do
you think you would be experiencing without the thought [that your wife
should treat you with more respect]?‖265 The client might respond by
observing that he would experience feelings of freedom and inner peace and
263. Id.
264. See COREY, supra note 54, at 307. Rational emotive therapists use a similar technique,
called ―rational-emotive imagery.‖ Id. Once clients are able to imagine themselves responding to an
experience with a more appropriate feeling, they ultimately reach the point where they are no longer
upset about the experience. Id.
265. See KATIE, supra note 137, at 16 (asking ―who would you be without the thought?‖).
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that he would experience the sense that all is well in the world. The client
should be encouraged to take a few moments to visualize what his life would
be like if it were not possible for him to entertain the unsettling thought. The
lawyer might encourage the client to close his eyes so that the client can
resonate more deeply with the experience of freedom.
If the client has difficulty imagining what it would be like to release the
angry thought, the lawyer might ask the client to imagine a world in which it
would not even be possible for him to have the distressing thought. If the
client still resists the visioning process, it might be because the client is stuck
in thought patterns of anger and frustration, or despair.266 To help the client
move out of that mental space, the lawyer might ask the client to name at least
three things in his life for which he is grateful and to share with the lawyer
why he is grateful for those aspects of his life. 267 By directing the client‘s
thoughts to those aspects of his life for which he is grateful, the client begins
to utilize neural pathways that are associated with gratitude, beauty, and
love.268 By opening the neural pathways associated with gratitude, the client
should be able to visualize the experience of releasing the angry thought. 269
iv. Question 4: Can You Think of a Time When . . . ?
After the client has had an opportunity to recognize, on a conscious level,
that his troubling thought does not serve him in any way, but only causes him
distress, the client is ready to reconsider his response to the original question:
―Can you really know that it’s true?‖270 To date, the client‘s anger has caused
perceptual distortions in the way he views the other party. Due to perceptual
biases that view the world through a lens that proves he‘s ―right,‖ the client
has blocked from his awareness those aspects of the other party‘s behavior
that do not comport with his angry beliefs.271
Therefore, the lawyer might lay a foundation for the next question by
reinforcing the idea that there is no logical benefit to holding onto the angry

266. See LUSKIN, supra note 21, at 112.
267. See id. at 111–17. Luskin uses the metaphor of reprogramming the remote control to a
television set. Id. at 112. He notes that ―a grievance can be seen as the remote control stuck on the
grievance channel.‖ Id. In order to move toward forgiveness, the person must ―change the channel‖
to a frequency that is associated with forgiveness. Id.
268. See SIEGEL, THE MINDFUL BRAIN, supra note 45, at 32 (noting that where we direct our
thoughts ―will stimulate neural firing in specific areas, and they will become activated and change
their connections within the integrated circuits of the brain‖).
269. See id.
270. See COREY, supra note 54, at 303 (―Once clients begin to accept that their beliefs are the
primary cause of their emotions and behaviors, they are able to participate effectively in the cognitive
restructuring process.‖).
271. COZOLINO, supra note 29, at 161–62.
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thought.272 The lawyer might summarize what the client has just relayed to
the lawyer—that the angry thought the client has about the other party causes
him pain and that, without the belief, he would be happier. The lawyer should
then ask the client to think of a time when the other party acted in a manner
that was the opposite of the client‘s angry thought (e.g., when the client‘s
spouse was respectful). Thus, the lawyer might state:
Lawyer: So Bob, what I‘ve heard you say is that your thought
that Rebecca doesn‘t respect you causes you no small degree
of pain. You feel it physically, with headaches and stomach
pain. And it also makes you a bit more impatient with your
children than you‘d like to be, and with other drivers on the
road. [Smiling] You also speculated that, if you let go of that
thought, you would feel more at peace. Did I get that right?
[Summarizing the client’s story and verifying the accuracy of
the lawyer’s understanding]
Client: Yeah, that‘s about it. Doesn‘t really make any sense
when you put it that way, does it?
Lawyer: No, it really doesn‘t, and yet we all tend to do it,
don‘t we—to hold onto thoughts that don‘t really serve us.
[Normalizing the client’s response] So, let‘s circle back to
the original question and see whether we can untether you
from a thought that doesn‘t serve any good purpose. I want
you to think back for a moment and think of a time when
Rebecca did treat you with respect.
Client: Oh . . . . Wow . . . . Well, that‘s hard to do. I just
don‘t think she‘s a respectful person.
Lawyer: I know. It‘s hard sometimes to see things differently
when we‘ve looked at it only one way for so long. Perhaps it
would help to think back to the beginning of your
relationship, perhaps even before you were married. When
was a time that she treated you with respect? [Asking the
question again, linked to an earlier time frame]
Client: Okay. That helps. I remember that she used to make
special dinners for me. She even called up my mom one time
and asked her for a recipe she knew I loved. She then
surprised me by making it for me that night.
272. See supra notes 69–80, 260–63 and accompanying text.
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Lawyer: Yes. That‘s exactly what I‘m talking about.
[Recognition statement] How about another time when she
treated you with respect, with love . . . ?
Client: Okay. Yeah, I guess she has always been pretty good
about . . . .
If possible, the lawyer should ask the client to relay two or three concrete
examples of behavior that challenge the client‘s polarized thinking. By
bringing to the client‘s awareness specific, concrete examples of when the
polar opposite of the client‘s angry belief is also true, the client begins to see
that his original angry thought is only partially true—it is only one version of
reality. As the client begins to relinquish aspects of his polarized thinking, he
sees the other party more accurately and completely. He begins to see, for
example, a spouse who is respectful at times and disrespectful at other times.
With these concrete examples filling out the client‘s memory bank, it is easier
for the client to let the anger go. 273
D. Next Steps
The dialogue described in this Article may be emotionally draining for the
client. Therefore, the lawyer might well decide to schedule a follow-up
meeting in which the lawyer and client can re-evaluate their litigation
strategy. Scheduling a follow-up meeting has the additional advantage of
providing the client with some time to assimilate the discussion and even to
engage in follow-up work at home before the lawyer and client re-evaluate
their legal strategy. However, for some clients, the clarity that comes from
freeing the mind of anger and resentment might make the client‘s choice of
options very easy, particularly if the option under consideration was a fairly
clear-cut choice of whether to engage in an immoral or unethical strategy. In
that case, the lawyer and client might decide on a litigation or settlement
strategy before ending the meeting.
1. Client‘s ―Homework‖
It is likely that the client will have additional complaints about the other
party that would be helpful for the client to address and release. The lawyer
might suggest that the client take home the rest of his written complaints

273. See DOUGLAS N. FRENKEL & JAMES H. STARK, THE PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 151
(2008). Frenkel and Stark point out that, in mediation, acknowled ging positive aspects of the other
party ―can sometimes help people stop from demonizing each other and reduce the tension of a
difficult conflict.‖ Id.
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about the other party and subject each statement to the same inquiry. 274
Because the release of angry thoughts will facilitate a richer, more open
dialogue about the client‘s legal options, the lawyer might also wish to make
the homework a required next step before the next meeting.275
2. Re-evaluating the Client‘s Options
Whether or not the lawyer schedules a follow-up meeting for this purpose,
at some point the lawyer and client should re-evaluate the client‘s objectives
and options, including their litigation strategy. Without the anger and
resentment that has obscured the clarity of the client‘s thinking, the lawyer
and client should now be positioned to have a more realistic and thoughtful
discussion of the client‘s ultimate objectives and the potential litigation and
settlement strategies that are most likely to achieve them.
In this phase of the counseling session, the lawyer and client should
candidly reflect on the advantages and disadvantages of pursuing various
alternatives and how those various alternatives might affect the client‘s
economic and quality-of-life objectives. With greater clarity and diminished
emotional reactivity, the client should be more receptive to the lawyer‘s
assessment of the risks involved in escalating the conflict. Moreover, freed of
some of the perceptual biases and distortions that were fueled by the client‘s
anger, the client should be able to provide the lawyer with a more realistic
assessment of how the other party might respond to different litigation tactics.
Thus, the lawyer should be able to intelligently and effectively help the client
come to a decision about the options that will best serve his short-term and
long-term interests.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has suggested that adversarial litigation dictated by the
demands of angry and vengeful clients becomes an escalating cycle of war
that harms not only third parties but also the clients themselves. The
litigation-as-war mentality inflicts psychological, emotional, and
physiological harm on the vengeful client, negatively impacting not only the
quality of the client‘s life but also the client‘s life expectancy.

274. During the cognitive inquiry, the client is likely to find a number of other beliefs that are
also causing him to suffer. Once the client understands how to work through this cognitive inquiry
and has found some measure of relief from the process in the lawyer‘s office, the client can use the
inquiry at home with respect to other painful thoughts not addressed in the lawyer‘s office.
275. At this stage of the process, because the client has been freed of some of the anger that has
been holding him hostage, the client might also be open to a recommendation to see a mental health
professional, who can help the client work through some of the other issues with which the client is
presently struggling.
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Building on studies from neuroscience and cognitive psychology, this
Article has shed light on why angry clients are so resistant to rational appeals
based on morality and even their own economic self-interest. Because such
appeals do not address the underlying pain that is driving the client‘s quest for
vengeance, lawyers are often unsuccessful in dissuading their clients from
abusing the litigation process.
This Article has explored a more effective way for lawyers to counsel
vengeful clients. Drawing on a rich body of scholarship from within the field
of psychology, this Article has provided a prescriptive framework for lawyers
to engage in a structured dialogue with vengeful clients aimed at helping them
reduce the level of anger and resentment they have brought with them into the
litigation process. With the clarity that comes from releasing anger and
resentment, lawyers can more effectively help clients assess their ultimate
objectives and the alternatives that will best help them attain such objectives.
This Article has also attempted to inspire lawyers to rise to their higher
calling—that of counselors at law who facilitate the healing of conflict. In the
words of Thich Nhat Hanh: ―Each moment is a chance for us to make peace
with the world, to make peace possible for the world, to make happiness
possible for the world.‖276 There can be no higher calling for any lawyer than
to facilitate the healing of an angry client‘s inner war.

276. THICH NHAT HANH, TEACHINGS ON LOVE 99 (1998).

